

# CHAPTER ONE

## ISLAMISM AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN THE NEW WORLD ORDER

FETHI MANSOURI & SHAHRAM  
AKBARZADEH

This book is concerned with political ideologies inspired by, and framed within, Islamic ideas and concepts. It focuses specifically on the violent manifestations of these ideologies and movements within their indigenous national locales, but also in light of their increasing adversarial encounters with the West. However, it would be a mistake to equate recent debates within the Muslim world with one set of ideological ideas, be they modernist, traditionalist or radical conservative. Indeed, Islamic exposés on modernity and reform have been dominant themes in Islamic scholarship since the first quarter of the nineteenth century<sup>1</sup>.

However, in recent years and in particular following the terrorist attacks of September 11, international debates about Islam have been dominated by security concerns, threats of terrorism and rising levels of xenophobic attitudes towards Muslims as culturally ‘othered’ individuals, and societies. In this context, a number of key concepts increasingly shape public debate across the Muslim world and beyond. These concepts, many of which are ill-conceived and grossly misunderstood, pertain to ‘Islamism, terrorism and reform’<sup>2</sup>. In an increasingly inter-connected world, Islam has become synonymous in the minds of many with political upheavals, security risks and indiscriminate violence. The current climate of security-driven politics reinforce the perception that Islam is destined to remain associated with these negative labels for some decades to come. This is, in fact, because the political instability associated with parts of the Islamic world is also reflected in a glaring lack of genuine political reforms in most Muslim states.

Yet, the situation has not always been this bleak. Since the mid 19<sup>th</sup> century Muslim thinkers and scholars have been trying to create an Islamic democratic society in which Islamic principals and modernisation can go hand in hand. There is, however, still a long way to go, as an unlikely ‘coalition’ of religious traditionalists *and* authoritarian secular leaders are resisting change.

The process of democratisation itself has long been resisted by ruling elites in the Muslim world, and, until recently, has not been encouraged by the West. Ironically, the ambitious US project of exporting liberal democracy to the Muslim world has provided many of the Islamist organizations - which tend to be the best organised and arguably with the largest support base- with a legitimate avenue via the ballot box to political power.

Undoubtedly, the salience of Islam in contemporary world politics has increased dramatically over the last decade, a development that has had major impact on domestic politics in the Muslim world, as well as Western states with significant Muslim populations. Political Islam - also referred to interchangeably as Islamic fundamentalism, radical Islamic, Islamism and Islamic revivalism- has in recent years caught the attention of policy makers, media commentators and academic researchers alike. Political Islam has become increasingly synonymous with instability, conflict and violence in both Muslim states, and some Western societies. This salience, though intensified in the last few years, is in fact the product of developments that go back more than 25 years when the Islamic revolution in Iran declared one of its key objectives the export of political Islam to other Muslim states in the region and beyond. Indeed, 'Islamism fuelled Iran's 1979 Islamic Revolution and the current "Islamization" campaign in Pakistan and Sudan. It contributed to the turmoil in Lebanon and the exit of the Israeli army from that country in May 2000, chased the well-equipped Soviets from Afghanistan, was responsible for the assassination of Egypt's Anwar al-Sadat, and has been an essential factor in the continuing Arab-Israeli dispute'<sup>3</sup>. Against this background, little wonder that the events of September 11 have catapulted a new discursive paranoia about political Islam to almost unprecedented levels. The unfortunate legacy of this media focus is the emergence of new discourse on Islam and political Islam that tends to conflate the two, and in many cases confuse the many 'forms of Islamism [that] run the gamut from moderate and modernist to reactionary and revolutionary'<sup>4</sup>.

As a way of steering away from this methodological minefield, it is sufficient to note here at the outset of this book that there are significant differences between various religious groups and ideologies across the Muslim world, with regard to two key functions: (a) whether they pursue a political agenda, in which case they are commonly labelled 'Islamist' groups; or whether they are in pursuit of religious rather than political objectives and as such can be described as 'Islamic'. The plethora of ideologies and diverse tendencies characterises both streams. However, the chapters in this book are concerned with political 'Islam' and its many associated groups and ideologies. In an increasingly interdependent international political and economic order, it is critically important to understand the historical contexts and current social

cleavages that facilitate the emergence of Islamist political ideologies in their various manifestations.

This is because the current tension that dominates Western-Muslim encounters is predominantly political rather than theological. The common religious features between Islam and the other monotheistic religions extend to commitment to social justice, equality and the sanctity of life<sup>5</sup>. It is at the political level that the tension is most apparent, with a history of direct colonialism, indirect economic dominion and, more recently, a neo-colonial strategic hegemony that is perceived in the Muslim world as the main cause of the political disorder and economic stagnation that prevails across the region.

The emerging post-Cold War order has seen Islam gradually painted - in some quarters at least - as the new menace to Western societies and the source of immediate threat to its liberal democracies and secular cultures. This post 1991 order was shocked by the events of September 11 that brought the psychological devastation of terrorism and violence to the American backyard. September 11 invoked a considerable backlash against Muslims living in the Muslim world, but also against Muslim Diasporas in the West<sup>6</sup>. The nature and scale of the terrorist act itself sparked outrage, horror and intense shock throughout the world. Understandably, the Western world, and in particular the US, felt the impact of the tragedy profoundly, despite the fact that spasmodic terrorist acts had been initiated against US interests, as no attack of this magnitude had ever been orchestrated by terrorists on American soil.

What these tragic events revealed was that there was a lack of understanding by many policy makers and analysts in the West of why an event like this would occur in America. Political leaders quickly pointed the finger of blame at somebody or something that had an inherent dislike for what the US, and by extension the West, stood for. When Osama bin Laden's Al-Qaeda emerged as the principal culprit, the responses emanating from Western conservative circles tended to paint Islam - the ideological system- as equally culpable for the terrorist attacks.

9/11 followed a series of terrorist activities over a number of decades in which Islam had been portrayed as a threat to the 'free world'. This event cemented some Western leaders', and the Western mass media positioning of Islam as a homogeneous entity that incites primordial anti-Western violence: 'Perhaps more clearly than through any event in the past, Islam was seen as providing a rationale for mass murder and terrorism, emphasised by bin Laden's rhetoric.'<sup>7</sup>

Certain sections within the (conservative) Western media and other sources of anti-Islamic discourse pointed to bin Laden's anti-Western statements and the expressions of joy at the events on the streets of Palestine as 'evidence' that Islam was a bloodthirsty, primitive religion that promoted terrorist

activities.<sup>8</sup> Moreover, the element of surprise caused instant insecurity and paranoia throughout the Western world, which previously had been complacent about its perceived isolation from widespread violent conflicts. Compounded by the fact that some of the 9/11 terrorists had previously operated in the US through migration networks, hysterical and panicked sections of the public in Western nations – prompted by some sections of the media and conservative governments – looked at their fellow citizens, and also at asylum seekers - whether Arab, Muslim or both - as followers of a violent, conflictual religion, potential terrorists and untrustworthy individuals.<sup>9</sup>

### **The discursive construction of Islam and Muslims**

The public and political discourse emanating from a number of Western countries - in particular the USA- in relation to regional conflicts gave rise to a problematic and at times populist association of Islam with ‘extremism, intolerance and violence.’<sup>10</sup> Such events include the Iranian revolution of 1979, the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Gulf War of 1990-91, and terrorist activities undertaken around the world, committed in the name of Islam, for example in the Middle East, the Philippines and Indonesia.<sup>11</sup> As such, any perceived causal relationship between Islam and Arabs on the one hand, and political violence and oppression on the other, has not been constructed solely as a result of the events of September 11. Indeed,

Anti-Arab racism in the West has a long genealogy. One of the most important aspects of its formation is that it is intricately related to the genealogy of anti-Muslim sentiments. In both the academic orientalist tradition analysed by Edward Said, and the dominant popular Western racist imaginary the boundaries between being an Arab and being a Muslim is greatly blurred.<sup>12</sup>

Certainly such a negative and essentialist discourse has been heightened in the aftermath of the recent terrorists attacks, though it must be emphasized that it is by no means a new addition to the continuum of Western discourse on Islam and the Arabs. In fact, ‘malicious generalizations about Islam have become the last acceptable form of denigration of foreign culture in the West.’<sup>13</sup> The ‘clash of civilizations’ thesis epitomized by Samuel P. Huntington, portrays Islam as a ‘single, coherent entity’, which is forever and inevitably on a path towards violent conflict with ‘the West’.<sup>14</sup> Huntington writes:

So long as Islam remains Islam (which it will) and the West remains the West (which is more dubious), this fundamental conflict between two great civilizations and ways of life will continue to define their relations to the future even as it has defined them for the past fourteen centuries.<sup>15</sup>

Such sweeping and hostile generalizations deny Islam its diversity in terms of character, practices and beliefs, and present Muslims as having intrinsic natures that are best discussed pejoratively.<sup>16</sup> This has had dangerous consequences for inciting hatred and distrust towards Muslims:

The deliberately created associations between Islam and fundamentalism ensure that the average reader comes to see Islam and fundamentalism as essentially the same thing. Given the tendency to reduce Islam to a handful of rules, stereotypes, and generalizations about the faith, its founder, and all of its people, then the reinforcement of every negative fact associated with Islam – its violence, primitiveness, atavism, threatening qualities – is perpetuated.<sup>17</sup>

Well before 9/11, the Western imaginary constructed an Islamic totality that was associated with violence, oppression and terror. The social and psychological impacts of recent events on Islam and Muslims, therefore, must be understood as a product of a long history of misunderstanding and antagonism towards Islam in many sections of Western society.

### **Scope and Themes of this Book**

The book considers the policies toward Islam and Muslims adopted by major international players, particularly in the context of regional and civil conflicts. In addressing these issues, the book explores a set of pressing challenges in the wake of September 11 and subsequent terrorist attacks. Acts of violence by extremist groups and the war on terror have added fresh uncertainties to an already complex global order and heightened a widely felt sense of insecurity in the West and the Muslim world alike. Just as terrorist activities and counter-terrorism are locked in a mutually reinforcing symbiosis, the sense of insecurity felt by Muslims and non-Muslims is mutually dependent and has the potential to escalate. This general assessment holds true for Muslims living in Muslim-majority states as for those living in the West.

This book is structured around three main sections dealing with pertaining to (i) Islamists and Muslim Diaspora in the West post 9/11; (ii) Islamists and political violence in Indonesia; and (iii) political Islam in the Middle East and Central Asia.

### **Islamists and Muslim Diaspora in the West post 9/11**

The new world order that has been discussed in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 has provided the platform for a new global agenda. As Brasted argues in chapter two, this new global agenda has implications for Western states especially the USA but more critically it has serious implications

for Islam, Muslims and the Middle East. Against the background of the dramatic collapse of the communist rival the USA declared a new agenda for a “new world order” based on a system of international relations governed by “the rule of law, not the law of the jungle”<sup>18</sup>. This rather optimistic reading of the world system post communism was to be shocked by a number of conflicts and terrorist acts that called Fukuyama’s end of history hypothesis into question<sup>19</sup>. As Brasted contends ‘neither “fundamentalist” Islam’s attack on the World Trade Centre in 2001 nor the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 were sufficient to persuade Fukuyama that “democracy and free markets” could be “derailed” as the “dominant organising principles” of the 21<sup>st</sup> century.’<sup>20</sup> Yet the ongoing instability in Afghanistan and the political mess and security conundrum in Iraq provide mounting evidence that hard power alone cannot bring about pre-conceived political outcomes in societies where cultural specificities and religious affiliations still play a major role in shaping individual value orientations as well as collective modes of social organisation.

Walker in chapter three introduces the notion of survivalist anxiety as a belief or fear that one’s own society might be swept aside by hostile outsiders. Within the context of the ‘war against terror’ this anxiety has taken on the character of a struggle for survival with militant Islam in the role of the outsider. As Walker argues, for much of Australia’s European history, an Islamic threat was at most latent, whereas an ‘Asian’ threat was more likely to be regarded as manifest. Most would now accept that these positions have been reversed. Historically, from the late nineteenth century, resurgent ‘Asia’ was considered more of a threat to ‘empty’ Australia than was the case with Islam and its adherents. While Islam was often viewed negatively as a backward religion given to fanaticism, Islam and its Muslim adherents appeared to have fallen into such a state of decay that no organised threat from them seemed possible. Contrary to the hysterical paranoia that followed September 11, Islam and the Muslim world at the time of Federation (1901) seemed incapable of sustaining a new challenge to the West. But irrespective of the identity and location of the enemy, survivalist narratives invariably serve several purposes as they invite an examination of one’s own society, its strengths, limitations and propensity to decline.

This negative depiction of Islam and Muslims and their association with a discourse of external threat, has persisted over time. The lack of appreciation of the local specificities of Muslim societies and the heterogenous nature of Islamic cultures is leading many in the West to conflate Islam with Islamist politics and by extension terrorism as Marshallsay argues in chapter four, this state of confused affairs is the by-product of many factors not least the selective interpretation of the Quran and other sources of Islamic law (Sharia) by Islamists. Marshallsay shows part of the reason why ‘Islam the religion has

been closely linked with acts of terrorism by particular militant Islamic groups' is that 'major concepts in traditional Islamic doctrines and history...have been utilized as the justification and rationale for the activities of militant Muslim activists'. This selective literal interpretation of the scripture resulted in transforming 'Islam's norms and values about good governance, social justice and the requirements to defend Islam, into a call for arms'.

Dealing with the increasingly complex issue of financing terrorist activities and organisations, McCulloch in chapter five discusses the financing of terrorism and the measures that have been enacted in the post 9/11 context to combat it. Situated within an Australian context, McCulloch argues that combating of financing of terrorism measures, consistent with other counter-terrorist measures, are aimed at intervening in terrorist activity before it occurs. She examines the implications of this pre-emptive framework for the criminal justice system, communities and individuals and argues that the measures are likely to have a significant impact on civil liberties. Additionally, because the pre-emptive framework inevitably employs race and religion as proxies for risk, these impacts will fall particularly heavily on those communities that are constructed as 'suspect communities' in the 'war on terror'. McCulloch goes on to show that the combating of financing of terrorism measures in particular and the 'war on terror' more generally, produce conditions favorable to the progress of neo-liberal globalization but are counter productive in producing conditions favorable to security.

The Australian experience with counter terrorism measures and its media coverage is further explored by Lentini in chapter six which examines the press coverage of two Australian 'rogue reverts' David Hicks and Jack Roche—the former accused of being an Islamist terrorist,<sup>21</sup> the latter convicted as one. Lentini questions whether the media have generated moral panics around these two converts to Islam represented as being marginal and disempowered individuals within society, whom the elites construct as 'folk devils'. Elite groups tend to use moral panics to initiate social change or resist changes to the status quo.<sup>22</sup> The core argument in Lentini's chapter is that ultimately human security can be adversely affected by how the media report and represent groups and events. Such representations can have a substantial impact on notions of human security. This is because unlike national security which concentrates on protecting the nation state, 'human security protects individuals from harm, ranging from threats including economic insecurity, disease and "threats to human dignity."<sup>23</sup> Lentini argues that as such media representations are inherently important to human security.

Baxter, in chapter seven, focuses on al-Muhajiroun in Britain as an émigré Islamist group well anchored within the ideology of Islamism whilst clearly situated within the melting pot of multicultural British society. Baxter

discusses the groups' so-called "covenant of security" and its links to scriptural Islamic theology. Through this exploration of contemporary socio-political experiences and the utilization or manipulation of Islamic doctrine Baxter shed light on the experience of one marginal organization committed to following the Islamist perspective from within the West. As Baxter argues, al-Muhajiroun's attempt to navigate the challenges in propagating an Islamist perspective while residing in a Western nation-state. Al-Muhajiroun's "covenant of security" constitutes the organization's clearest attempt to engage with the inherent difficulties in this objective. While al-Muhajiroun revealed its "covenant of security" in response to sustained media and political pressure, the concept was loosely linked to Islamic theological and historical experiences. Similar to the experience of other Islamist organizations, al-Muhajiroun emphasised and interpreted Islamic theology and tradition to legitimize its position.

### **Islamists and political violence in Indonesia**

Within the context of the Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, or GAM), Kingsbury in chapter eight addresses the wider issues raised by political Islam in relation to civil society, state and democracy. Kingsbury focuses in particular on perceptions of Islam that are held by key representative members of GAM most of whom GAM happen to be devout Sunni Muslims, a situation that lead observers to classify GAM as Islamic organization. Kingsbury discusses the Helsinki peace process which ended GAM's conflict with Indonesia and suggests that during the negotiations, GAM was able to reinvent itself as a political party with Islamic and democratic values underpinning its platform. This is further evidenced in Aceh's forthcoming local elections (for the governorship and other administrative posts) which demonstrate that the democratic orientations of GAM are not just procedural but substantive as they are taking root within the organization itself.

Similarly, Barton in chapter nine attempts to locate and describe Turkey's Gulen movement in an historical and national context comparing it with the mass-based Indonesian organizations of Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama. Barton addresses the big question of whether Islamic thought and Islamic social movements can be truly modern. Implied in this question is the narrower issue of whether Islam and liberal democracy are compatible. The diversity of Islamist political movements and the globalised nature of political Islam means that the cases discussed above in Kingsbury and Barton are by no means an indication that the trend among Islamist political activism is predominantly liberal and democratic.



## Political Islam in the Middle East and Central Asia

The last few years have witnessed a dramatic rise in Islamist political activities across the Middle East and Central Asia. This rise has been encapsulated by the electoral success of Islamist parties in the Palestinian Occupied Territories and Turkey as well as the wave of political transformations across a number of Central Asian republics. While many of these resurgent Islamist groups might have genuine reformist agendas, the situation is by no means unequivocal that most recent manifestations of political Islam are driven by pro-democratic pulses.

In fact, as Sankari shows in chapter ten the *Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami* (Islamic Liberation party) has been consistently radical in its goals and agenda, calling for the transformation of the political status quo across the region. The party's main political goals are to restructure polities, societies, and economies in various Muslim countries in conformity with its Islamist political vision that envisions Islam as a unique and comprehensive way of life, with a global mission encapsulating a coherent ideology, law and creed. Sankari argues that while *Hizb ut-Tahrir* is a radical antidemocratic party, there is no solid or incontrovertible evidence that the party has or is currently engaging in or planning violent activities.<sup>24</sup> This is precisely the dilemma of Western governments who promote democratic reforms in the Middle East and across the Muslim world but who do not necessarily rejoice when such political process yield an Islamist government that is essentially conservative in its social and political outlook.

A good case in point is the 1991 elections in Algeria when the Islamist party *Front Islamique du Salut*, (FIS) was set to win the legislative elections only for the government to abandon the vote with the West's blessing. MacQueen in chapter eleven goes a step further to show that there is a renewed intensification in relations between Algiers and Washington due to the newfound common security interests. Before the events of September 11, the US approach consisted of tacit support of the military-backed Algerian government's confrontation with the Islamists. This reluctance to openly support the military-backed regime in Algeria was a reflection of a number of factors most notably the implication of elements of the regime in the violence that engulfed Algeria since 1991, the stalling democratic process and the ailing Algerian economy. However, in the wake of September 11 this tacit support has been transformed to a more open backing for Algeria and the broader North Africa region as America widens its so-called "war on terror". By doing so, the Algerian government has effectively linked its international legitimacy to the new direction in American foreign policy. This new alliance has enabled states such as Algeria to resist pressure for political reform while increasing the reach of its oppressive security apparatus.

Nourzhanov in chapter twelve discusses the factors behind the dramatic leadership changes in the former Soviet Union (FSU) and the impact such ‘revolutions’ might have on human security, particularly in liminal societies caught between tradition and post-Soviet modernity. Taking the Muslim republics of Central Asia as case studies, these questions pertaining to political reform acquire an extra dimension represented by the increasingly visibility of political Islam. The core discourse of these political movements emphasize the message of equality, welfare, and social justice which resonate strongly in an atmosphere of ubiquitous authoritarianism and impoverishment across the region. This undemocratic situation allowed Islamists in Central Asia to move from the margins to the core of the political process. As Nourzhanov ponders, the question will remain whether groups such as *Hizb ut-Tahrir* and the Islamic Movement of Turkistan become less radical should the incumbent authoritarian presidents lose their grip on power. The transformation to a more democratic political system may well take the edge off Islamic militancy by opening new channels of non-confrontational engagement between state and society which could in turn weaken the populist base of the Islamist appeal. The risk, however, is that Islamist leaders would ‘use the uncertainty of a transition period to escalate their demands and shore up their positions, especially if leadership change does not lead to a rapid and dramatic improvement of governance’.

The association of Islamists ideologies with political violence and terrorism is perhaps best illustrated through the coverage of Palestinian struggle against occupation since the Al-Aqsa Intifada started in 2000. This coverage, unfortunately, tends to underestimate the multifaceted nature of political violence and the many strategic as well as political objectives it may serve for different groups. As Cheong shows in chapter thirteen, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) use of suicide attacks against Israel has served instrumental rather than religious objectives. In Cheong’s view, apart from its immediate goal of resisting Israeli occupation, the PIJ’s attacks have been used to demonstrate the movement’s operational capabilities, and its capacity to affect change in the political process. The religious considerations in this context play a secondary role to these strategic and political imperatives. Violence, therefore, is pursued not only as a resistance mechanism but also as a means to distinguish the PIJ from secular rivals. The religious language within suicide bombings are dressed serve to emphasise the movement’s Islamic credentials, which in turn assist in the recruitment process.

## Conclusion

As the various contributions to this volume show, the relationship between Islam the religion, and Islamism the political ideology cannot be reduced to whatever discursive pronouncements certain individuals might articulate. Indeed, it has been argued<sup>25</sup> that the problem of the current impasse is not the theological content of Islam, 'but the way believers refer to this corpus to adapt and explain their behaviours in a context where religion has lost its social authority'.

The current debate about Islamist movements and their conservative agendas seems to perpetuate the historical mistake of overgeneralisation and reductionism in dealing with Islam and the Muslim world. During the eighties and early nineties the ideologies and political activism of Islamist parties that emerged in Algeria, Turkey, Egypt and Palestine and other Muslim countries have tended to be framed within confrontational political agendas. In some cases, there was even an insistence by these groups on an Islamic view (worldview some might argue) that placed priority on the application of Islamic law (*sharia*) across the Muslim nation (*ummah*)<sup>26</sup>. This conceptual framework that dominated Islamist political discourses for decades has recently been replaced with a more tempered stance where participation in the mainstream political process is high on the agenda. Ironically, the recent successes of Islamist parties in Lebanon, Palestine, Turkey and parts of Southeast Asia and Central Asia have provided additional evidence that fundamentalist Islamism has given way to a more pragmatic form of political ideology able and ready to engage in Realpolitik.

The current debate within Islamic groups is largely driven by a contest over how existing ideological parameters can be negotiated to connect Islam and Muslims to the increasingly globalised world system. The great majority of groups within both conservative and liberal Islamism emphasise the need for engaging with existing political frameworks that have dominated post-colonial Islamic states for decades. It is only for radicalised conservative groups such as Afghanistan's Taliban that the possibility of *jihadi* militancy against local governments and their international backers becomes a likely threat.

Ultimately, one of the objectives of this book is to engage with a complementary, if at times conflicting, set of ideas and concepts about political Islam and its various protagonists. The chapters included in this volume reveal a truly heterogeneous system of political thought and action, one that renders lazy attempts at generalisations all the more derisory. It is unfortunate that most recent encounters between Islam and the West have tended to be limited to the confines of a small number of groups and movements that adhere to anti-modernist strands within the broader Islamic system of political and social ideas. While a discussion on the root causes of ideology construction is beyond the

scope of this book, it is hoped that a more nuanced understanding of the specific local contexts within which certain ideologies and movements emerge will ultimately provide a sound empirical platform for more measured rhetoric.

<sup>1</sup> Maaddel, M and K. Talattof (2002), 'Contemporary debates in Islam', in Moaddel, M and K. Talattof (eds), *Modernist and Fundamentalist Debates in Islam – A Reader*, Palgrave MacMillan: England, p1..

<sup>2</sup> International Crisis Group (ICG), 'Islamism in North Africa: the Legacies of History'. Middle East and North Africa Briefing, 2004, Cairo/Brussels.

<sup>3</sup> Husain, M.Z. (2003), 'Global Islamic Politics'. Longman: New York, p.vii.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid, p.vii.

<sup>5</sup> See A. Saikal, (2003), 'Islam and the West: Challenges and Opportunities' in V. Hooker and A. Saikal (eds), *Islamic Perspectives on the New Millennium*. Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore.

<sup>6</sup> See, for example, Chomsky's two short books *September 11*. USA/Australia: Allen & Unwin, 2001 and *Power and Terror: Post-9/11 Talks and Interviews*. New York: Seven Stories Press, 2003 for more discussion on this.

<sup>7</sup> A. Saeed (2003), '*Islam in Australia*'. Sydney: Allen & Unwin, p.186.

<sup>8</sup> G. Hage, (2002) 'Postscript: Arab-Australian belonging,' *Australians Today: Citizenship and Belonging*, edited by G Hage, Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, p.243.

<sup>9</sup> Hage, Ibid, p.243

<sup>10</sup> Saeed, *Islam in Australia*, 184.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid

<sup>12</sup> Ray Jureidini and Ghassan Hage (2002), 'The Australian Arabic Council: anti-racist activism.' In *Arab-Australians Today: Citizenship and Belonging*, edited by G. Hage, 173-191. Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, p.173.

<sup>13</sup> Edward W. Said (1997), *Covering Islam: How the Media and the Experts Determine How We See the Rest of the World*. London: Vintage Books, p.xii.

<sup>14</sup> Said, *Covering Islam*, in particular see xvi.

<sup>15</sup> Samuel P. Huntington (2002), *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order*. London: Simon & Schuster, p. 212.

<sup>16</sup> Said, *Covering Islam*, see in particular xi – xxii.

<sup>17</sup> Said, *Covering Islam*, xvi.

<sup>18</sup> George H.W.Bush, "Address before Joint Session of Congress", September. 11, 1990, "Address to the Nation on the Invasion of Iraq", January 16, 1991, and "Address to Joint Session of Congress on End of Gulf War", March 6, 1991. Accessed from Miller Center of Public Affairs Archive [hereafter MCPAA]: <http://www.millercenter.virginia.edu/snippets/digilibary/prezspeeches/ghbush/index.html>

<sup>19</sup> Francis Fukuyama "The End of History?" Summer (1989): 3-18; and *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York: Free Press, 1992).

<sup>20</sup> Fukuyama, "we remain at the end of history", *The Independent*, October 11, 2001.

<sup>21</sup> Islam is the faith revealed to the Prophet Muhammad in the 7<sup>th</sup> Century CE. Islamism refers to implementing '...Islam in a comprehensive manner with particular emphasis on actualizing its ideals in the socio-political sphere.' Farid Esack, *Qur'an, Liberation,*

*Pluralism*, p. xi. Not all forms of Islamism are violent. It encompasses 'activists' who seek socio-political change through the ballot box and civil society, 'militants' who advocate non-violent overthrow of existing political systems, as well as 'terrorists' who employ political violence against innocent civilians and non-combatants in order to achieve Islamist objectives David Wright-Neville, 'Dangerous Dynamics: Activists, Militants, and Terrorists in Southeast Asia'.

<sup>22</sup> On these matters see Cohen, *Folk Devils and Moral Panics: The Creation of the Mods and Rockers*; Goode and Ben-Yahuda, *Moral Panics: The Social Construction of Deviance*; Thompson, *Moral Panics*.

<sup>23</sup> Human Security Centre, *The Human Security Report 2005: War and Peace in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*, p. viii.

<sup>24</sup> M. as-Sa 'aadi, "Al-'Unfu as-Siyyasi fil-Harakat al-Islamiyyeh al-Mu'asirah," *Al-Fikr al-Islami*, 16, 1 (1987): pp. 29-30

<sup>25</sup> O. Roy (2002), 'Globalised Islam: the search for a new ummah'. Hurst & Company: London, pix.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid*, p.1