



# Racialized (Im)mobilities: The Pandemic and Sinophobia in Australia

Sylvia Ang & Fethi Mansouri

To cite this article: Sylvia Ang & Fethi Mansouri (2022): Racialized (Im)mobilities: The Pandemic and Sinophobia in Australia, Journal of Intercultural Studies, DOI: [10.1080/07256868.2022.2105311](https://doi.org/10.1080/07256868.2022.2105311)

To link to this article: <https://doi.org/10.1080/07256868.2022.2105311>



Published online: 01 Aug 2022.



Submit your article to this journal [↗](#)



Article views: 92



View related articles [↗](#)



View Crossmark data [↗](#)



# Racialized (Im)mobilities: The Pandemic and Sinophobia in Australia

Sylvia Ang and Fethi Mansouri

Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalisation, Deakin University, Melbourne, Australia

## ABSTRACT



The COVID-19 pandemic has impacted countries all over the world, not only in relation to public health responses, but on multiple other societal levels. The pandemic has uncovered structural inequalities within and across societies and highlighted how race remains a powerful lens through which public policy responses are constructed and pursued. This paper examines (im)mobilities in Australia in the context of Asian, and more specifically Chinese-Australian citizens and residents, and how these have been framed in racialized discourses that justified exclusionary practices reminiscent of the White Australia ideology. The paper focuses on how Chinese Australians' mobilities have been (mis)represented and attacked in public and political discourse with particular attention to the situation of Chinese international students' (im)mobilities. Our conceptual attention in this paper, however, is not only on the racialization of mobilities but also immobilities, underpinned by an understanding of the relationality between Othered 'migrants' and hosts, as well as between mobility and immobility. We conclude by discussing future patterns of mobility, how these will impact prospective migrants including international students, and what future forms of mobilities might mean for Australia as a country highly dependent on migrants for its economic, social and cultural development.

## KEYWORDS

COVID-19 pandemic; mobility; diversity; race relations; Sinophobia; racialization

## Introduction

Since its emergence in late 2019, the COVID-19 pandemic has played out at once as a serious public health challenge as well as a deeply unsettling social phenomenon. The pandemic has uncovered structural inequalities within and across societies producing, in the context of lockdowns and border closures, new forms of (im)mobilities at the local, national and global levels, highlighting once again the uneven landscape of mobility practices (Cresswell 2020; Cairns et al. 2021; Skovgaard-Smith 2021). As the meanings and practices of mobility are being devalued and revalued (Cresswell 2020), mobilities have emerged in more contested, racialized ways during the pandemic. Indeed, the COVID-19 global crisis has had the unintended consequence of exacerbating ideological beliefs in racial hierarchies, dividing the global community into an 'us' versus Othered

**CONTACT** Sylvia Ang  sylvia.ang@deakin.edu.au  Building C, Level 1 Melbourne Burwood Campus, 221 Burwood Campus, Burwood VIC 3125, Deakin University, Melbourne, Australia

© 2022 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group

‘them’ dichotomy. This can be seen in the sharp rise in anti-Asian (particularly anti-Chinese) racism all over the world, facilitated by global characterizations of the COVID-19 virus as a ‘Chinese virus’ or ‘Kung flu’ (Barreneche 2020).

Anti-Asian forms of racism are not altogether a new phenomenon but have resurfaced and indeed intensified in the wake of COVID-19 in many countries including North America (Li and Nicholson Jr 2021), the United Kingdom (Gao and Sai 2021), Australia (Elias, Mansouri and Yin 2021), India (Haokip 2020) and Singapore (Lee and Loke 2020). The landscape of local, national and global mobilities has also changed (Cresswell 2020) and has been increasingly racialized since the pandemic. At the local level, incidents ranging from racial slurs to physical attacks (Russell 2020) have immobilized Asian and Chinese communities. Asian Americans, for instance, have reported being afraid to go grocery shopping, travel alone on subways or buses, or to let their children go outside (Tavernise and Oppel Jr 2020). At the national level, preferential mobilities have emerged in racialized ways during the pandemic. In Australia, Australian citizens returning home from certain countries or regions with large outbreaks – such as the US, the UK or Europe – were not barred from entry, while Australian citizens in India were singled out and banned from entering Australia in May 2021, prompting criticisms that the policy was ‘racist’ (Khorana 2021; Time 2021). The surge of COVID-19 in India and the circulation of the term ‘Indian variant’ in May 2021 fuelled anti-Indian messages and even physical abuse, as was the case for a Singaporean Indian woman who was attacked in Singapore (Reuters 2021; Venugopal 2021). The racialization of mobilities has also taken place in Australia and has targeted Chinese Australians in particular. While the racialization of Chinese Australians’ mobilities parallels, to some extent, the phenomenon in countries such as the US, it has emerged in ways unique to the spatial, temporal, social and cultural context of pandemic Australia. Since the intersections of mobility and race take different forms at different scales, and in different times and places (Nicholson and Sheller 2016: 5), this paper focuses on Chinese Australians’ mobilities to provide insights into the different forms and scales racialized (im)mobilities have taken during the pandemic in Australia. The paper also reflects on the potential consequences of these racialized (im)mobilities and how they may shape future (im)mobilities. In so doing, this paper aims to contribute to two broader questions. First, how have Chinese Australians’ mobilities been racialized at the local, national and global levels since the pandemic? Second and relatedly, what new forms or *whose* mobilities will be valued into the future, and in what ways?

### **Racialized (Im)mobilities: A Conceptual Framework**

Mobilities – whether as movements, representations or practices – are inherently underpinned by relations of power and meaning (Cresswell 2010). Mobilities shape and are shaped by various social categories and dimensions including gender, class, sexuality, dis/ability, and importantly in the context of this paper, race. Unequal relations of power are intrinsic in both mobility and race and can produce a racialized mobility politics (Nicholson and Sheller 2016). This paper parallels Cotten Seiler’s concerns with the ‘racialization of mobility’, defined as the ways in which ‘the modern practices and institutions of mobility have been and remain highly racialized’ (Seiler 2009: 232). Historically, mobility and race have intersected ‘in unequal relations of power that make

mobility racially loaded in particular moments while also making racial processes, racialized spaces, racialized identities, including whiteness, deeply contingent on differential mobilities' (Nicholson and Sheller 2016: 8). The COVID-19 pandemic is an important 'moment' where racially loaded mobilities have (re)emerged.

Our attention in this paper, however, is not only on the racialization of mobilities but also the many consequent forms of immobilities. Our conceptualization is underpinned by an assumption that all forms of mobilities are relative and must be understood in relation to one another (Adey 2006). Our focus on relative mobilities functions at two levels: the relationality between (perceived) migrants and hosts, as well as the relationality between different manifestations and practices of mobility and immobility.

In relation to the concept that mobilities are relative between (perceived) migrants and hosts, one can see empirically that 'some are more in charge of it than others; some initiate flows and movement; some are more on the receiving end of it than others; some are effectively imprisoned by it' (Massey 1993: 61). Migration and more generally human mobility 'implicates both physical bodies moving through material landscapes and categorical figures moving through representational spaces' (Delaney cited in Cresswell 2006: 4). Socially constructed notions of 'migrants' embody a perpetual state of mobility while host societies often imbue (im)mobility with particular nationalist meanings, including defining an assumed immobility as loyalty while suggesting that migrants' mobility implies a lack of ethical orientation and local political attachment (S. Ang 2021). While there is some truth that highly mobile residents may find it harder to engage in community building activities, studies of transnationalism have shown that transient migrants can also be invested in host societies i.e. mobility does not necessarily equate to lack of local attachment (Isin 2013; Kallio and Mitchell 2016; Dyrness and Abu El-Haj 2020). Despite such evidence, however, the association of disloyalty with mobility remains dominant in host societies. As Ghassan Hage (2009) posited, both migrants and racists seek existential mobility – a sense that one is 'going somewhere' – and want to avoid stuckedness'. Hage suggests that racism can emerge from a comparative sense of (im)mobility and produce a kind of 'mobility envy': hosts may feel stuck where they are as they witness the migrant's mobility, which may manifest in terms of the migrant's shifting social class but also in other temporal and spatial ways. The migrant who is achieving social and spatial mobility thus stands out as different from the 'community', suggesting an unwillingness to be part of the community of the stuck. The racial dimension emerges in how migrants are then socially constructed and viewed: 'the ones who do not know how to wait are the "lower classes", the uncivilized and racialized others' (Hage 2009: 8).

Mobilities are also relative. Understanding different forms of mobilities requires first and foremost an understanding of immobilities, and vice versa. Absolute immobility does not exist (Adey 2006), and neither mobility nor immobility is privileged over the other. Rather, the meaning of mobility varies in relation to who is involved and in what particular social contexts (Adey 2010). To understand relative mobilities then, one must understand the meanings attached to both mobilities and immobilities; a task that can be attended to by unpacking the contemporary politics of mobility (Adey 2006; Cresswell 2010).

This paper focuses on how mobilities manifest in relative terms both at the level of the relationship between migrants and hosts, as well as in relation to the dynamic oscillation

along the mobilities and immobilities continuum. This framing avoids reproducing much extant literature that tends to ‘collapse analyses of race into a simplistic binary of immobility as an inherent characteristic of non-white people and the possibility of movement as only granted to white people’ (Hinger 2021: 1). While we agree with Ahmed that frequently, ‘[b]odies that do not extend the whiteness of ... spaces are “stopped”’ (Ahmed 2006: 24) and that coloured bodies ‘presence in public spaces circulates fear, anxiety as well as paranoia that justifies acts of impunity’ (Lobo 2021), we also recognize that how people practise and construct the meanings of mobility and immobility offer prospects for ‘creating new, radical, anti-racist movements and life in spite of white supremacy’ (Hinger 2021: 10).

In the following section, we examine these contested framings of (im)mobilities discursively and in the context of public opinions on China and Chinese Australians, collected through both global as well as Australian survey results. Subsequently, we discuss how Chinese Australians’ mobilities have been (mis)represented and attacked in public and political discourse with particular attention to the situation of Chinese international student (im)mobilities. The penultimate section briefly examines future patterns of mobility and how these will impact prospective migrants, including the critical cohort of international students. Finally, we conclude by discussing what future forms of mobilities might mean for Australia as a country that is highly dependent on migrants for its economic, social and cultural development.

## Global and Australian Public Opinions on China

One of the more confronting outcomes of the COVID-19 pandemic is the spike in ethno-cultural racism, in particular that directed at Asians and more specifically Chinese communities. This surge in racist attacks on Chinese and Asians groups can be seen in both everyday practices within many multicultural societies as well as at the level of media reporting and political discourse. For example, a 2021 survey by Pew Research Center found that in most of the 17 advanced economies surveyed, unfavourable views of China are at or near historic highs (Silver, Devlin and Huang 2021). Large majorities in most of the countries surveyed have broadly negative views of China, including around three-quarters or more of the respondents indicating this negative attitude in Japan, Sweden, Australia, South Korea and the US. In countries such as Australia, Sweden, the UK and Canada, unfavourable views, have remained unchanged since 2020 amidst various bilateral tensions and widely circulating views that China handled the COVID-19 pandemic poorly.

Recent surveys reporting Australians’ opinions of China similarly indicated heightened negative sentiments towards Chinese nationals. The July 2020 Scanlon Foundation surveys (Figure 1) examined attitudes towards ten specified national groups and found that negative responses for Chinese (47 per cent up from 13 per cent in 2013) was lower only than that recorded for Iraqis (49 per cent) and Sudanese (49 per cent). The 2021 poll by the Australia-China Relations Institute and the Centre for Business Intelligence & Data Analytics at the University of Technology Sydney (Figure 2) reported similar figures. The poll showed that Australians’ views on China have generally become more pessimistic, with most Australians (62 per cent) saying that their view of China ‘has become more negative following the start of the COVID-19 pandemic’.

‘Would you say your feelings are positive, negative, or neutral?’




Figure 1. The Scanlon Foundation Surveys (2020).

The poll also highlighted how negative views of China shape local perspectives on Chinese Australians. Approximately 63 per cent of Australians say that ‘Political tensions in the Australia-China relationship are negatively impacting Australians of Chinese origin’. Furthermore, 39 per cent of Australians say they believe that ‘Australians of Chinese origin can be mobilized by the Chinese government to undermine Australia’s interests and social cohesion’. By contrast, only 30 per cent of Australians disagree with this statement, with 31 per cent undecided (Collinson and Burke 2021). Similarly, the results of the Lowy Institute Poll 2021 (Figure 3) compared Australians’ views of China and Chinese people in 2016 and 2021 and found an increase in negative sentiments across all of questions, with 93 per cent of Australians (up from 79 per cent in 2016) now seeing China’s military activities in Australia’s region as a ‘negative influence’.

The significance of these global and national survey findings on China is that such negative attitudes would inevitably have flow-on negative effects on people of Chinese

Australian views on the Australia-China relationship




Figure 2. UTS:ACRI/BIDA Poll 2021 (Collinson and Burke 2021).

## VIEWS OF CHINA

LOWY INSTITUTE  
POLL 2021

For each of the following factors, please say whether, for you personally, they have a positive or negative influence on your overall view of China.




Figure 3. Lowy Institute Poll 2021.

descent living in those countries. As a settler-colonial nation, Australia already exhibits and experiences spatial-cultural dislocation as a white-majority country located in Australasia (Ang and Colic-Peisker 2021). Australia's Sinophobia, and a more general fear of a populous Asia close to its northern shores, is nothing new and harks back to the anxiety of the new federation vis-à-vis a supposed 'yellow peril' threatening the newly established 'white' colony from the north (Walker 1999). But this historical anxiety and suspicion of China has recently been amplified and exacerbated by China's economic ascent at the global level (Ang and Colic-Peisker 2021). Furthermore, and in relation to the current socio-demographic composition of the nation, people born in China are not only the third largest migrant community in Australia (as of 30 June 2020, ABS 2021) but also the biggest source of international students in Australia (Martin 2020), though this may change post-pandemic. Although Chinese Australians have acquired the status of a diligent, economically well integrated model minority, Sinophobia has always been close to the surface in Australia (Walker 1999; Ang and Colic-Peisker 2021). Anxiety about the rise of China is undoubtedly present among Australian political elites and in popular perceptions (Hamilton 2017; Sun 2021), including recent conspiracy theories of China 'leaking' the COVID-19 virus (Rudd 2020). While the White Australia policy is long abolished and population diversity has dramatically increased since, the perception of Australia as a white nation persists and has become starker during the pandemic (Elias, Mansouri and Yin 2021; Sun 2021). Those who cannot fit into a supposed core of Anglo 'white' identity continue to be Othered as not quite belonging to the nation (Ang and Colic-Peisker 2021). Historical characterization of the Chinese as 'purveyors of disease' and as outsiders in Australia (Bashford 2004: 148) have been revived. A survey found that 377 reports of racist incidents across Australia were made between 2



April 2020 and 2 June 2020 alone, with many Asian Australians – including Chinese Australians and new Chinese migrants – detailing how they were accused of having ‘brought the virus over here’ (Asian Australian Alliance 2020; Koslowski 2020). Sinophobia in Australia has been renewed (Ang and Colic-Peisker 2021); a historically documented fear of the Chinese as ‘yellow peril’ has now manifested in the racialization of Chinese Australians’ (im)mobilities (Walker 1999).

### Problematizing Chinese Australians’ Mobilities

Why are certain groups stopped, at what speed, through what rhythm, across what route, and with what feelings (Cresswell cited in Flores 2020: 250)? As Cresswell (2020) aptly notes, in general terms ‘mobility has come under attack’ during the pandemic, but some ‘racialised’ mobilities have come under attack in more intense ways than others. Specifically, the mobilities of Chinese Australians have come under the spotlight since the beginning of the pandemic and scrutiny has intensified during events associated with the management of domestic challenges and overseas outbreaks. For example, in January 2020, *The Daily Telegraph* published a large, bolded headline, ‘China kids stay home’; a misleading headline which misrepresented and stigmatized the mobilities of Chinese Australian children. The headline did not match the news item which reported on the New South Wales government’s appeal to all parents not to send their children to school, regardless of their ethnic and cultural backgrounds, if they had recently been to China (Armstrong and Hildebrandt 2020). Along similar racialized lines, a fake health alert in January 2020 warned Queenslanders to avoid areas with high Chinese populations. The alert claimed to be from the Queensland government and highlighted the suburbs of Sunnybank, Sunnybank Hills, Runcorn and Eight Mile Plains as well as ‘all populated areas with Chinese nationals of a ratio of one to three non-Chinese Australians’ (Truu 2020). Such stigmatization of Chinese Australians, whether in racist headlines or fake health alerts, has led to the demise of many Asian/Chinese businesses, including Chinese restaurants (Marozzi 2021). At the start of the pandemic, Asian and Chinese Australians’ visibility was also heightened, and racially charged, when they appeared in public wearing masks. Chinese Australians have reported being accused of carrying the virus due to their mask-wearing practice with many even reporting verbal and physical abuse (Yang 2020). In Hobart, Tasmania, for instance, there have been reports of verbal and physical attacks against Asians in general, including, for example, a Hong Kong student being taunted and punched in the face for wearing a medical face mask at a local supermarket (Baker 2020). Taunts of ‘go back to China’ towards Asian and Chinese Australians have also intensified in Australia (Sun 2021; Om 2020; Yang 2020). As Ien Ang (2021: 9) aptly notes, the command – ‘Go back to your own country!’ – is commonly flung at ‘racialized others considered outsiders who don’t have a right to be “here”’. The expression reflects a spatial distancing of self and other (I. Ang 2021: 10) where ‘the native’ feels entitled to control the space of the nation and order the ‘others’ out and is a ‘territorialized form of exclusionary othering’ (I. Ang 2021: 10–11).

Racialized attacks on mobilities have not only been directed at Chinese Australians but also toward the objects they move and where they move these objects to. As Hannam, Sheller and Urry (2006: 1) suggest, multiple mobilities such as people’s movements,




objects, capital and information, are entangled in social processes and structures. In this case, seemingly neutral objects take on political even pejorative connotations when their movement or spatial arrangements are seen to be at the hands of Chinese Australians. For instance, false claims about Chinese people stock-piling goods during the pandemic went viral, despite the lack of any credible evidence of such systematic, collective behaviour. Many of these claims racialize Chinese Australians as selfish stockpilers who hoard and sell goods overseas for profit during the pandemic (Wilson 2020). On 26 March 2020, *The Sydney Morning Herald* newspaper published a report which stated that ‘staff from the Chinese government-backed global property giant Greenland Group were instructed to put their normal work on hold and source bulk supplies of essential medical items to ship back to China’ (McClymont 2020). While the facts of the article are correct, and the effort was legal and humanitarian – consisting of donations from companies and individuals in Australia – the sourcing of medical supplies was, rather than an act of ‘hoarding’, an effort to address the virus’ initial outbreak in Wuhan (January to February 2020) at a time when Australia was not anticipating a serious pandemic (Sun 2021). By publishing the story on 26 March, when Australia was beginning to feel the brunt of the virus and was acutely in need of medical supplies, the article paints a picture of a predatory China and a disloyal Chinese diaspora (Sun 2021: 32). It comes as no surprise that parallel to such demonizing of Chinese Australians were calls to boycott Chinese products amidst Australia-China tensions and the pandemic. Kennards’ Self Storage CEO Sam Kennard, for example, called for Australian businesses to drop suppliers from China and further calls have been made to boycott wines from Chinese-owned Australian wineries (Cartwright 2020). As Urry (2007: 51) suggests, attention to both human and non-human forms of mobility provides important insights into ‘the significance of systems that distribute people, activities and objects in and through time-space’. In this case, our analysis shows that immobilities are imposed on Chinese Australians in multiple ways: in their personal movements, in the objects they wish to move, and in relation to the businesses they own or operate. The ways in which immobilities are imposed on Chinese Australians reveal the relationality between socially constructed notions of ‘migrants’ and hosts as well as between mobility and immobility. The underlying message from racist headlines, fake health alerts and attacks on Chinese Australians in public as well as the objects they wish to move is that Chinese Australians, regardless of their resident status or length of stay in Australia, are assumed to be ‘migrants’ and should ‘go back to China’. As ‘migrants’, the messages sent by these incidents is that Chinese Australians, who are perceived as achieving social and spatial mobility, should be made immobile in Australia, like the rest of the ‘community’, the community of the stuck.

### Chinese Students’ International (Im)mobilities


Although Australian borders have been open to international students since late 2021, foreign observers and international students are unlikely to forget Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison’s instruction to international students who cannot support themselves to ‘make your way home’ at the start of the pandemic. One may ask how is this instruction different from the racist trope, ‘go back to your own country’? Indeed, it is an illustration of the spatial distancing of self and other (I. Ang 2021: 10) we have

already discussed. International students may hold temporary visas in Australia but they contribute significantly to Australian society and its economy. While international students' mobility (to Australia) was previously lauded for its economic value, their mobilities were questioned and attempts were made to restrict them during the pandemic. They were asked to leave the country if they could not support themselves, in what amounts to a call to reverse their mobilities and 'go home'. In their survey of over 6,100 temporary visa holders (such as international students, graduates and working holiday makers), Berg and Farbenblum (2020) found hundreds of respondents tied a sense of long-lasting distress, anger and dehumanization to the Prime Minister's instruction to 'make your way home'. The determination to exclude temporary migrants from government support packages also contributed to feelings of abandonment, humiliation and worthlessness (Berg and Farbenblum 2020). The survey found 59 per cent of international students indicated that following their experience during COVID-19, they were less likely or far less likely to recommend Australia as a place to study (Figure 4). This included important international education markets such as students from China, of whom 76 per cent were now less likely to recommend Australia for study (Figure 5). We note that students from Hong Kong (Figure 5) did not feel as strongly about not recommending Australia for study, reminding us firstly of the diversity within the ethnic Chinese community, and secondly that Australian-China politics affect students from mainland China more than students from other Chinese communities.

Furthermore, many Chinese international students were also confused and disappointed by the first travel policy directive issued by the Australia Federal Government on 1 February 2020 regarding COVID-19 control (Qi and Ma 2021). This policy differentiated Chinese international students' mobilities from other international students' mobilities. Indeed, in early February, the Australian Department of Education, Skills and Employment released a policy statement on 'Novel Coronavirus FAQ: Advice for International Students'. This statement explicitly required Chinese international students wishing to return to Australian universities to observe a 14-day quarantine period in a



**Figure 4.** Proportion of international students, graduates and Working Holiday Makers who were less likely to recommend Australia as a destination for study or a working holiday (Berg and Farbenblum (2020)).



**Figure 5.** Proportions of international students who were now less likely to recommend Australia as a place to study, for nationalities with more than 40 respondents (Berg and Farbenblum (2020)).

third country to avoid their visas being cancelled. The document states: ‘If you are an international student and travel to mainland China, you will not be able to enter Australia until 14 days had passed since you left mainland China’ (Version 1, DESE, 2020, 7). This travel policy misled and confused many Chinese international students who were caught off guard by the sudden policy change (Qi and Ma 2021). However, despite the ban of direct entry from China, 47,000 Chinese citizens entered Australia from China, via detours through Malaysia, Thailand, and Cambodia (Choudhury 2020; Haugen and Lehmann 2020). This exclusionary travel policy has led to criticisms that Australia’s reaction vis-à-vis Australian students is unconscionable as it sought to externalize the risk of COVID-19 infection and spread while profiting from international student mobility (Choudhury 2020; Haugen and Lehmann 2020).

While a pilot program in 2021 to allow some international students to return to Australia was initially likely to exclude Chinese nationals due to rules surrounding vaccination status (Ong 2021), the recognition of Sinovac in October 2021 by Australia’s Therapeutic Goods Administration means Chinese international students are now allowed back into Australia (Bagshaw and Massola 2021; Xing and Handley 2021). Growing broader geo-political tensions between Australia and China, however, may significantly challenge Chinese international students’ mobilities even if the pandemic situation was to improve. A survey of 1,012 students conducted in China between June 5 and 15 2020 found that students in China heeded their government’s warnings against studying in Australia due to the ‘danger’ of COVID-19 and ‘discrimination’ against Chinese students. It also found that only 40 per cent of students in China who previously intended

to study overseas still plan to, while just under 50 per cent of those who had studied overseas plan to return to their study after the borders reopen. Due to growing tensions between China and the West – even before COVID-19 – middle-class parents in China had become increasingly concerned about the safety of, and possible discrimination against, their children abroad, including in the US and Australia. The pandemic may have accelerated this already worrying trend (Zhang 2020).

Nevertheless, there is little doubt that perceptions of Chinese students' mobilities have shifted from being positive, valuing their contributions to local communities and economies, to one that is being perceived as threatening or suspect during the pandemic in relation to health and social risks. Indeed, the geographic location and proximity of Chinese students during the pandemic, as well as their mobilities between the two countries, have become connected to and contingent on their ability to support themselves and minimize health risks to Australia (in the early days of the pandemic) via third-country quarantine arrangements.

On the domestic front, Chinese international students' mobilities have also been subjected to pandemic politics, whether in terms of their vaccination status (which was previously grounds to deny them entry to Australia or threatened their ability to stay) or China's warnings against studying in Australia. However, even as Chinese international students' mobilities were targeted, student narratives of this experience suggest practices and constructions that offer possibilities beyond white-defined mobilities. For instance, some Chinese international students chose to see the travel restrictions imposed on them as opportunities to take extended holidays or to see family members residing in a third country (Fang and Zhao 2020; Power 2020). Others have simply decided not to come to Australia (even when given the option of moving through a third country) (Fang and Zhao 2020), take a leave of absence, study in another country, or complete their studies online. Some even cited these alternatives as more desirable, rooted in what they saw as a safer environment in China in the context of the pandemic (Yuan and Ding 2021). Of course, Chinese international students' (re)definitions of their mobilities have not escaped scrutiny, yet again, by the media. Take for instance the Australian media website *News.com.au*, running with the headline, 'Students beat coronavirus travel ban by partying and dining out in exotic location', complete with a picture captioned 'A Chinese student in Phuket' (Graham 2020). Similarly, *The Australian* headlined a picture of Asian women at a beach with 'Quarantine or a fortnight of fun?' It even subtitled its article, 'More than 11,000 Chinese university and high school students have used the "back door" to sidestep the ban on Chinese nationals flying direct to Australia' (The Australian 2020). These headlines represent vilification of Chinese students' mobilities and remind us that host societies infuse (im)mobility with particular meanings: immobility can imply loyalty while mobility can be constructed to imply immorality (Ang 2021). Therefore, the meanings and practices of mobilities are relative, and contested. The racialization of Chinese mobilities, however, will have broader social and economic consequences, whether in terms of future Chinese international students or prospective migrants to Australia, as we discuss in the section below.

## Future Mobilities: What New Forms and Whose Mobility Will be Valued?

In addition to its impact on social cohesion and the cultural fabric of the nation, racialized attacks on Chinese mobilities in Australia during the pandemic may ultimately have significant socio-economic consequences especially in terms of two important flows into Australia: Chinese international students and prospective migrants. There may also be consequences in terms of outflows of current residents with Asian/Chinese heritage.

### *Chinese International Students*

The racialization of pandemic politics domestically and internationally has the capacity to shape how Australia is perceived by prospective international students, especially those of Asian backgrounds. Indeed, studies have suggested that international students are likely to resort to regionalization when considering options for tertiary studies. Pre-pandemic, there were signs that East Asia would become a key hub for higher education and boost intra-regional student circulation (Lipura and Collins 2020). China's Belt and Road Initiative and educational and research investments across Southeast Asia and beyond support such predictions. Further, the intensification of tensions, since the pandemic, in China-US relations and in China-Australia relations may amplify pre-existing nationalism in both sending and destination countries. This could lead to an increase of students to East Asian education destinations (Sidhu et al. 2021). Sidhu et al. (2021) suggest that travel restrictions and health concerns are also likely to cause international students to regionalize their mobilities. Preference for traditional study destinations may be re-evaluated as international students look towards destinations where they feel culturally safe (Sidhu et al. 2021). The safety of host cities and the openness of their residents has always been a priority for international students and their families, even before COVID-19. Branch campuses and universities that are closer to home may now feature more strongly in international students' choices. The capacity and effectiveness of health and medical infrastructures and the cost of student health insurance will also be key considerations in students' choices (Sidhu et al. 2021).

Will international branch campuses in students' home countries and virtual student mobility become norms? Scholars have suggested that this is unlikely (Versaevel and Pamintuan 2020; Sidhu et al. 2021). The pandemic has placed pressure on international branch campuses to catch up with the standards of mother campuses. Some Western higher education institutions – such as New York University, Pennsylvania State University, the University of Arizona, and several French business schools – depend on their international branch campuses to ensure their international students do not postpone or cancel their study plans (Versaevel and Pamintuan 2020). Students who had initially applied and were offered admissions to study abroad but are unable or unwilling to travel are now given the option to temporarily study in a branch campus in their home country, until the pandemic stabilizes. However, only a small minority accepted such offers, indicating that physical mobility is an investment from which they seek a 'mobility dividend'; a dividend which must be earned from immersion in a new society, which could not be accessed by studying in a local branch campus (Versaevel and Pamintuan 2020). Considerations of the mobility dividend also means virtual student mobility is unlikely to replace student mobility programs involving physical travel entirely. However, virtual

student mobility is already a norm, if not widely adopted, and could become a more viable option post-pandemic. Hybrid programs offering both virtual and physical mobilities may offer more options to combine overseas credentials with domestic degrees. Technology-enabled internationalization of higher education has been touted as one such method, although further research is required to ascertain how broad an audience of university students it will appeal to (Mittelmeier et al. 2020). At the same time, insiders in the international education industry are expecting a return to pre-pandemic levels of mobilities, citing the cosmopolitan aspirations of young people and their families as well as persistent views that Anglophone cultural capital can advance employability and livelihood security (Sidhu et al. 2021). In other words, despite international headlines that show the racialization of Chinese and Asian mobilities all over the world including in Australia, mobility to Western countries is still highly valued by young people. The industry will certainly focus on marketing student mobility and continue to imbue it with *the promise of cultural, social and economic capital* to ensure student migration pathways remain relevant.

### **Prospective Migrants**

The consequences of the politics of ethno-cultural racism in relation to Chinese Australians and international Chinese students will also have implications for Australia attracting migrants in the future, especially migrants of Asian backgrounds, due to a migration regime dominated by temporary visas (Robertson 2019) and a rising pandemic racism. As of June 2020, migrants born in India and China were the second and third largest groups of migrants in Australia (ABS 2021). Prospective migrants may be less willing to migrate post-pandemic, especially if they are only offered temporary visas with no prospects for permanent status (Papademetriou and Hooper 2020). The uncertainty of being accepted where they settle, their (in)ability to find employment or look for another job if they are laid off, and to bring their family members with them may prove too risky for high-skilled migrants (Papademetriou and Hooper 2020). Furthermore, if migrants have been forced to return to their home countries during the pandemic, it would be difficult to attract them back to the destination country.

Pandemic racism against migrants may also have the effect of repelling many migrants away from their destination countries and causing an outflow of current residents with Asian backgrounds. The surge in pandemic racism and the targeting of Australians with Asian backgrounds are unprecedented and well documented (Uribe 2020; Walden 2020). A survey of more than 3,000 people by the Australian National University found Asian Australians were more likely to have their livelihoods negatively affected by COVID-19 and were overall more anxious about the pandemic than other Australians (Walden 2020). While the study's findings suggest this could be because Asian Australians were younger, more likely to live in metropolitan areas and to work in businesses affected by lockdowns, the effect of discrimination cannot be discounted (Walden 2020).

International attention to pandemic racism in Australia will also play a role in prospective migrants' choice of destination. For instance, the issue of an alert by the Chinese Ministry of Culture and Tourism, reporting a 'significant increase' in racist attacks on 'Chinese and Asian people' is likely to shape Chinese nationals' opinion of Australia. While the alert was issued to Chinese citizens urging them not to travel to



Australia, and is targeted mostly at potential Chinese tourists, it led to a surge in Chinese social media discussions, and national as well as international headlines (ABC 2020; Uribe 2020). As discussed earlier, a survey of over 6,100 temporary visa holders – including international students, graduates and working holiday makers – found that 59 per cent of those visa holders said that, following their experience during COVID-19, they were less likely or much less likely to recommend Australia as a place to study or as a place to have a working holiday (Beg and Farbenblum 2020). This included important international education markets such as Chinese students (of whom 76 per cent were now less likely to recommend Australia for study) and Nepalese students (69 per cent were less likely to recommend Australia) (Beg and Farbenblum 2020). Yuan and Ding (2021) found that despite Australia's plan to reopen borders to international students in late 2021, some Chinese students were not eager to return. Some are weighing up their study options, choosing to study online, go to another country and/or reconsidering their move to Australia (Yuan and Ding 2021). We are reminded that possibilities beyond white-defined mobilities are ever-present: while moving to study in Western countries may for some signify mobility and its associated access to Anglophone capital, for others, the immobilities that racists could potentially impose on them in host countries can drive them towards staying in their home country – where they may enjoy other forms of mobilities including the freedom to move without having one's mobility problematized.

## Conclusion

The COVID-19 pandemic is not the first of its kind and is not likely to be the last. Indeed, an independent intergovernmental body comprising more than 130 member governments, the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES) cautioned in a report that, 'Future pandemics will emerge more often, spread more rapidly, do more damage to the world economy and kill more people than COVID-19 unless there is a transformative change in the global approach to dealing with infectious diseases' (IPBES 2020b). The report also warned that '[t]he underlying causes of pandemics are the same global environmental changes that drive biodiversity loss and climate change' (IPBES 2020a). Such scenarios are likely to impact how mobility is understood, governed and practiced as well as how mobilities may at times be racialized. Mobility, particularly in relation to skilled migration, will be a critical dimension of pandemic management. The pandemic has, for example, highlighted the significant deficit in medical occupations in many high-income countries (Fagan et al. 2020; Awad 2021; Humphries et al. 2021). Therefore, the possibility of future pandemics will intensify pre-existing demands for highly skilled workers, such as medical doctors, nurses and other medical professionals (Papademetriou and Hooper 2020; Awad 2021; Humphries et al. 2021), especially in the Gulf and in Europe (Awad 2021), the US and the UK (Fagan et al. 2020) and in regional and rural Australia (Davies 2020; Australian Government 2021).

In the future, migrants' mobilities decisions and Australia's migration and mobilities policies will be shaped by Australia's plans for multiculturalism, the growing norms of remote work, as well as new internal mobility dynamics around urban-rural transformations (Guaralda et al. 2020; Mansouri 2020; Martin and Bergmann 2021). Due to the



negative national and international headlines Australia has attracted in relation to pandemic racism, how Australia approaches and manages diversity and multiculturalism in the future will be closely watched by prospective migrants and students, in particular those of Asian/Chinese backgrounds. For migrants who could not leave or have significant reasons to stay in their destination countries, political rights, cultural acceptance, social inclusion and economic opportunities in destination countries will increase in importance and will shape decisions whether to remain in Australia (Galante 2020). At the same time, remote work mobilities may persist at least to some extent post-pandemic (Martin and Bergmann 2021). Infrastructure costs and business travel expenses are likely to remain reduced (Martin and Bergmann 2021). Businesses are likely to plan for even more flexible practices that reduce the requirements for physical mobility. In the tech sector, for instance, some major companies have already initiated remote or hybrid operations for the medium, if not longer, term (Martin and Bergmann 2021). For the privileged, voluntary urban-rural migration has been underway. In Australia, residents particularly from the two largest states of Victoria and New South Wales have moved to coastal cities and towns to escape COVID-19 risks and strict pandemic restrictions (Guaralda et al. 2020). The pandemic has increased interest in post-pandemic urban planning and sustainability strategies. The recognition that cities are vulnerable to pandemics may lead to more political will to develop rural and regional areas to ease population density in cities (Martin and Bergmann 2021). For instance, there are already talks to reduce the pressure on capital cities and boost regional Australia's growth (Australian Government 2019; Guaralda et al. 2020). However, studies have warned about the risks of growing regional areas without careful design, which may transfer the ills of capital cities to regional areas (Guaralda et al. 2020).

Overall, Australia may have to rethink its current model of migration and mobilities, particularly in relation to how and under what visa types migrants and workers across the skills program spectrum will be admitted. Furthermore, with the possibility of future economic downturns and rising unemployment, governments will come under pressure in relation to how they navigate the political backlash that returning to large-scale immigration is likely to generate. More importantly, there are questions as to whether employers will be willing to advocate for more workers from abroad, rather than invest in training resident workers (Papademetriou and Hooper 2020). All of this will have serious implications for Australia including the need to rethink and rework its post-pandemic migration and multiculturalism policies to support its super-diverse society, as well as meet the needs of its growing international student population and migrants. As representatives of one of the largest demographic cohorts in Australia, migrants of Asian and Chinese backgrounds are unlikely to stand for the continued racialization of their mobilities, whether now or in future.

### Notes on contributors

Dr *Sylvia Ang* is Alfred Deakin Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalization, Deakin University. She is a sociologist of migration, ethnic relations and social inequalities. Her monograph *Contesting Chineseness: Nationality, Class, Gender and New Chinese migrants* was recently published (Amsterdam University Press 2022).

Professor *Fethi Mansouri* holds an Alfred Deakin Research Chair in migration and intercultural studies at Deakin University. He is a leading scholar nationally and internationally with expertise on cultural diversity, migration, citizenship, intercultural relations, social inclusion, and Muslims in the West.

## Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

## References

- ABC. 2020. China warns citizens not to travel to Australia amid 'increased' racism since coronavirus outbreak. *ABC News*, 6 June 2020. <https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-06-06/do-not-travel-to-australia-china-warns-citizens-of-racism/12328488>.
- ABS. 2021. Migration, Australia. *Australian Bureau of Statistics*. <https://www.abs.gov.au/statistics/people/population/migration-australia/latest-release>.
- Adey, P., 2006. If Mobility Is Everything Then It Is Nothing: Towards a Relational Politics of (Im)mobilities. *Mobilities*, 1 (1), 75–94.
- Adey, P., 2010. *Mobility*. Abingdon: Routledge.
- Ahmed, S., 2006. *Queer Phenomenology: Orientations, Objects, Others*. New York: Duke University Press.
- Ang, I., 2021. On the Perils of Racialized Chineseness: Race, Nation and Entangled Racisms in China and Southeast Asia. *Ethnic and racial studies*, 45 (4), 757–777. doi:10.1080/01419870.2021.1990979.
- Ang, S., 2021. The Myth of Migrant Transience: Racializing New Chinese Migrants in Mobile Singapore. *Mobilities*, 16 (2), 236–248. doi:10.1080/17450101.2021.1885835.
- Ang, S., and Colic-Peisker, V., 2021. Sinophobia in the Asian Century: Race, Nation and Othering in Australia and Singapore. *Ethnic and racial studies*, 45 (4), 718–737. doi:10.1080/01419870.2021.1921236.
- Armstrong, C., and Hildebrandt, C. 2020. China kids stay home. *The Daily Telegraph*, 29 January 2022.
- Asian Australian Alliance. 2020. *COVID-19 Coronavirus Racism Report*. Sydney: Asian Australian Alliance. <http://diversityarts.org.au/app/uploads/COVID19-racism-incident-report-Preliminary-Official.pdf>.
- Australian Government, Department of Health. 2021. *Training program expanded to tackle rural doctor shortages*. Australian Government, Department of Health. <https://www.health.gov.au/ministers/the-hon-mark-coulton-mp/media/training-program-expanded-to-tackle-rural-doctor-shortages>.
- Awad, I., 2021. On Occasion of the Pandemic: Reflections on Egyptian Labour Migration. *International migration*, 59 (1), 281–284.
- Bagshaw, E., and Massola, J. 2021. Australian regulator approves Chinese COVID jab Sinovac for travellers. *Sydney Morning Herald*, 1 October 2021. <https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/australian-regulator-approves-chinese-covid-jab-sinovac-for-travellers-20211001-p58wdj.html>.
- Baker, E. 2020. Hong Kong student accused of having coronavirus was 'punched for wearing a face mask'. *ABC News*, 20 March 2020. <https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-03-20/coronavirus-hong-kong-student-assaulted-for-wearing-face-mask/12075470>.
- Barreneche, S.M., 2020. Somebody to Blame: On the Construction of the Other in the Context of the COVID-19 Outbreak. *Society register*, 4 (2), 19–32. doi:10.14746/sr.2020.4.2.02.
- Bashford, A., 2004. *Imperial Hygiene: A Critical History of Colonialism, Nationalism and Public Health*. Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Berg, L., and Farbenblum, B., 2020. *As If We Weren't Humans: The Abandonment of Temporary Migrants in Australia During COVID-19*. Sydney: Migrant Worker Justice Initiative.

- Cairns, D., et al., 2021. An Immobility Turn? The COVID-19 Pandemic, Mobility Capital and International Students in Portugal. *Mobilities*, 16 (6), 874–887. doi:10.1080/17450101.2021.1967094.
- Cartwright, D. 2020. Boycotting Chinese businesses and products will do more harm than good to Australia. *News.com.au*, 11 December 2020. <https://www.news.com.au/finance/business/boycotting-chinese-businesses-and-products-will-do-more-harm-than-good-to-australia/news-story/6c9fffb24b20532f7af47b1e30bec1>.
- Choudhury, S.R. 2020. Australia universities let Chinese students get around a travel ban. Critics warn it could spread the coronavirus. *CNBC*, 5 March 2020. <https://www.cnbc.com/2020/03/05/corona-virus-australia-let-chinese-students-circumventtravel-ban.html>.
- Collinson, E., and Burke, P. 2021. UTS:ACRI/BIDA Poll 2021: Australian Views on the Australia-China Relationship. Sydney: Australia-China Relations Institute <https://www.australiachinarelations.org/content/utsacribida-poll-2021-australian-views-australia-china-relationship>.
- Cresswell, T., 2006. *On the Move: Mobility in the Modern Western World*. New York: Taylor & Francis.
- Cresswell, T., 2010. Towards a Politics of Mobility. *Environment and planning D: Society and space*, 28 (1), 17–31. doi:10.1068/d11407.
- Cresswell, T., 2020. Valuing Mobility in a Post COVID-19 World. *Mobilities*, 16 (1), 51–65. doi:10.1080/17450101.2020.1863550.
- Davies, J. 2020. Regional healthcare worker shortages continue to worsen after a decade of government inaction. *ABC News*, 26 April 2020. <https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-04-26/regional-health-shortages-an-ongoing-problem/100084232>.
- Dyrness, A., and Abu El-Haj, T.R., 2020. Reflections on the Field: The Democratic Citizenship Formation of Transnational Youth. *Anthropology & education quarterly*, 51, 165–177.
- Elias, A., Mansouri, F., and Yin, P., 2021. *Racism in Australia Today*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Fagan, J.J., et al., 2020. COVID-19 Exposes Health Worker Shortages in the USA and UK, but Nationalism and Self-Interest Must not Exploit Medical Workforces from low- and Middle-Income Countries. *South african medical journal*, 110 (5), 12905. doi:10.7196/samj.2020.v110i5.14774.
- Fang, J., and Zhao, I. 2020. Coronavirus ban sees students head for third countries to see out quarantine period. *ABC News*, 12 February 2020. <https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-02-12/coronavirus-international-students-travel-through-third-country/11954618>.
- Flores, L.A., 2020. Stoppage and the Racialized Rhetorics of Mobility. *Western journal of communication*, 84 (3), 247–263. doi:10.1080/10570314.2019.1676914.
- Galante, J.S. 2020. Global crises and migrant futures (an historical view). *Compas*, 2 July 2020. <https://www.compas.ox.ac.uk/2020/global-crises-and-migrant-futures-an-historical-view/>.
- Gao, G., and Sai, L., 2021. Opposing the Toxic Apartheid: The Painted Veil of the COVID-19 Pandemic, Race and Racism. *Gender, work & organization*, 28 (S1), 183–189. doi:10.1111/gwao.12523.
- Graham, B. 2020. Students beat coronavirus travel ban by partying and dining out in exotic locations. *News.com.au*, 4 March 2020. <https://www.news.com.au/travel/travel-updates/health-safety/students-beat-coronavirus-travel-ban-by-partying-and-dining-out-in-exotic-locations/news-story/6f9b675ad1b43c0a8bf5af381a2f50a1>.
- Guaralda, M., et al., 2020. Towards Australian Regional Turnaround: Insights Into Sustainably Accommodating Post-Pandemic Urban Growth in Regional Towns and Cities. *Sustainability*, 12 (24), 10492. doi:10.3390/su122410492.
- Hage, G., 2009. Waiting Out the Crisis: On Stuckedness and Governmentality. *Anthropological theory*, 5, 463–475.
- Hamilton, C., 2017. *Silent Invasion: China's Influence in Australia*. Melbourne: Hardie Grant Publishing.
- Hannam, K., Sheller, M., and Urry, J., 2006. Mobilities, Immobilities and Moorings. *Mobilities*, 1 (1), 1–22. doi:10.1080/17450100500489189.

- Haokip, T., 2020. From 'Chinky' to 'Coronavirus': Racism Against Northeast Indians During the Covid-19 Pandemic. *Asian ethnicity*, 22 (2), 353–373. doi:10.1080/14631369.2020.1763161.
- Haugen, HØ, and Lehmann, A., 2020. Adverse Articulation: Third Countries in China–Australia Student Migration During COVID-19. *Dialogues in human geography*, 10 (2), 169–173. doi:10.1177/2043820620934939.
- Hinger, B., 2021. Toward an Expanded Approach on Black Mobilities. *Progress in human geography*, doi:10.1177/03091325211030329.
- Humphries, N., et al., 2021. COVID-19 and Doctor Emigration: The Case of Ireland. *Human resources for health*, 19, 29. doi:10.1186/s12960-021-00573-4.
- IPBES. 2020a. Workshop Report on Biodiversity and Pandemics of the Intergovernmental Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services. Bonn, Germany: IPBES secretariat.
- IPBES. 2020b. Escaping the 'Era of Pandemics': Experts Warn Worse Crises to Come Options Offered to Reduce Risk. Media release. IPBES secretariat, Bonn, Germany. doi:10.5281/zenodo.4147317.
- Inin, E. F., ed. 2013. *Democracy, Citizenship and the Global City*. New York: Routledge.
- Kallio, K.P., and Mitchell, K., 2016. Introduction to the Special Issue on Transnational Lived Citizenship. *Global networks*, 16 (3), 259–267.
- Khorana, S. 2021. The India travel ban has been slammed as racist but Indian-Australians have long been subjected to racism. *The Conversation*, 4 May 2021. <https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-05-04/indian-australians-feel-singled-out-unsurprising-subject-racism/100114596>.
- Koslowski, M. 2020. Almost 400 anti-China attacks since pandemic began. *Sydney Morning Herald*, 7 June 2020. <https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/almost-400-anti-china-attacks-since-pandemic-began-20200607-p550a8.html>.
- Lee, M., and Loke, L. 2020. Some Chinese Workers, Businesses in Singapore Shunned Amid Fear and Anxiety Over Covid-19, *Today*, 9 February 2020. <https://www.todayonline.com/singapore/some-chinese-workers-businesses-singapore-shunned-amid-fear-and-anxiety-over-covid-19>.
- Li, Y., and Nicholson Jr, H.L., 2021. When 'Model Minorities' Become 'Yellow Peril'—Othering and the Racialization of Asian Americans in the COVID-19 Pandemic. *Sociology compass*, 15 (2), e12849. doi:10.1111/soc4.12849.
- Lipura, S.J., and Collins, F.L., 2020. Towards an Integrative Understanding of Contemporary Educational Mobilities: A Critical Agenda for International Student Mobilities Research. *Globalisation, societies and education*, 18 (3), 343–359. doi:10.1080/14767724.2020.1711710.
- Lowy Institute Poll, 2021. *Lowy Institute Poll 2021*. Sydney: The Lowey Institute. <https://poll.lowyinstitute.org/>.
- Lobo, M. 2021. Straying Beyond the Well-worn Path: Fighting for Racial Justice and Planetary Justice. *Journal of Intercultural Studies*, 42 (1), 33–45. doi:10.1080/07256868.2020.1859206.
- Mansouri, F. 2020. *The Socio-cultural Impact of COVID-19. Exploring the Role of Intercultural Dialogue in Emerging Responses*. Paris: UNESCO Briefing Papers. <http://www.unesco-cdsj.com/unesco-chair/new-briefing-paper-the-socio-cultural-impact-of-covid-19-exploring-the-role-of-icd-in-emerging-responses/>.
- Marozzi, M. 2021. Chinese businesses still suffering after-effects of COVID-19 as Lunar New Year dawns. *ABC News*, 11 February 2021. <https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-02-11/chinese-businesses-still-affected-by-covid-this-lunar-new-year/13136646>.
- Martin, F., 2020. *Chinese International Students' Wellbeing in Australia: The Road to Recovery*. Melbourne: The University of Melbourne. <http://hdl.handle.net/11343/240399>.
- Martin, S., and Bergmann, J., 2021. (Im)mobility in the Age of COVID-19. *International migration review*, 55 (3), 660–687. doi:10.1177/0197918320984104.
- Massey, D., 1993. Power-geometry and Progressive Sense of Place. In: J. Bird, ed. *Mapping the Futures: Local Cultures, Global Change*. London and New York: Routledge, 280–288.
- McClymont, K. 2020. Chinese-backed company's mission to source Australian medical supplies. *Sydney Morning Herald*, 26 March 2020. <https://www.smh.com.au/national/chinese-backed-company-s-mission-to-source-australian-medical-supplies-20200325-p54du8.html>.

- Mittelmeier, J., et al., 2020. Conceptualizing Internationalization at a Distance: A “Third Category” of University Internationalization. *Journal of studies in international education*, 25 (3), 266–282. doi:10.1177/1028315320906176.
- Nicholson, J.A., and Sheller, M., 2016. Race and the Politics of Mobility Introduction. *Transfers: interdisciplinary journal of mobility studies*, 6 (1), 4–11. doi:10.3167/TRANS.2016.060102.
- Om, J. 2020. Report reveals racist abuse experienced by Asian Australians during coronavirus pandemic, *ABC News*, 24 July 2020. <https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-07-24/coronavirus-racism-report-reveals-asian-australians-abuse/12485734>.
- Ong, T. 2021. Australian plan to bring back foreign students likely to exclude Chinese, *Bloomberg*, 24 September 2021. <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-09-24/australian-plan-to-bring-back-foreign-students-closed-to-china>.
- Papademetriou, D.G., and Hooper, K., 2020. Commentary: How is COVID-19 Reshaping Labour Migration? *International migration*, 58 (4), 259–262. doi:10.1111/imig.12748.
- Power, J. 2020. Chinese students stranded by Australia’s travel ban can head back to class, via a third country. *South China Morning Post*, 16 February 2020. <https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3050742/chinese-students-stranded-australias-travel-ban-can-head-back>.
- Qi, J., and Ma, C., 2021. Australia’s Crisis Responses During COVID-19: The Case of International Students. *Journal of international students*, 11 (S2), 94–111. doi:10.32674/jis.v11iS2.3578.
- Reuters. 2021. Singapore PM condemns alleged attack on woman of Indian descent over mask. *Reuters*, 11 May 2021. <https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/singapore-pm-condemns-alleged-attack-woman-indian-descent-over-mask-2021-05-11/>.
- Robertson, S., 2019. Migrant, Interrupted: The Temporalities of ‘Staggered’ Migration from Asia to Australia. *Current sociology*, 67 (2), 169–185. doi:10.1177/0011392118792920.
- Rudd, K. 2020. The Murdoch media’s China COVID-19 conspiracy has one aim: get Trump re-elected, *The Guardian*, 8 May 2020. <https://www.theguardian.com/media/2020/may/08/murdoch-media-china-covid-19-conspiracy-trump-kevin-rudd>.
- Russell, A. 2020. The Rise of Coronavirus Hate Crimes. *New Yorker*, 17 March 2020. <https://www.newyorker.com/news/letter-from-the-uk/the-rise-of-coronavirus-hate-crimes>.
- Seiler, C., 2009. Mobilizing Race, Racializing Mobility: Writing Race Into Mobility Studies. In: Gijs Mom, Gordon Pirie, and Laurent Tissot, eds. *Mobility in History: The State of the Art in the History of Transport, Traffic and Mobility*. Switzerland: Editions Alphil-Presses Universitaires Suisses, 229–233.
- Sidhu, R., et al., 2021. International Student Mobilities in a Contagion: (Im)mobilising Higher Education? *Geographical research*, 59 (3), 1–11. doi:10.1111/1745-5871.12471.
- Silver, L., Devlin, K., and Huang, C., 2021. *Large Majorities Say China Does Not Respect the Personal Freedoms of Its People*. Washington, DC: Pew Research Center. <https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2021/06/30/large-majorities-say-china-does-not-respect-the-personal-freedoms-of-its-people/>.
- Skovgaard-Smith, I., 2021. Transnational Life and Cross-Border Immobility in Pandemic Times. *Global networks*, 1–16. doi:10.1111/glob.12350.
- Sun, W., 2021. The Virus of Fear and Anxiety: China, COVID-19, and the Australian Media. *Global media and China*, 6 (1), 24–39. doi:10.1177/2059436421988977.
- Tavernise, S., and Opiel Jr., R.A. 2020. Spit On, Yelled At, Attacked: Chinese-Americans Fear for Their Safety. *New York Times*, 23 March 2020. <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/23/us/chinese-coronavirus-racist-attacks.html>.
- The Australian. 2020. Coronavirus quarantine or a fortnight of fun? *The Australian*, 4 March 2020. <https://www.facebook.com/theaustralian/posts/more-than-11000-chinese-university-and-high-school-students-have-used-the-back-d/10151415009364978/>.
- The Scanlon Foundation Surveys. 2020. *Mapping Social Cohesion*. Melbourne: The Scanlon Foundation Research Institute. <https://scanloninstitute.org.au/research/mapping-social-cohesion>.
- Time. 2021. After Australia Banned Its Citizens in India From Coming Home, Many Ask: Who Is Really Australian? *Time*, 19 May 2021. <https://time.com/6047130/australia-india-covid-travel-ban/>.



- Truu, M. 2020. Fake coronavirus alert warns Queenslanders to avoid areas with high Chinese populations. *SBS News*, 27 January 2020. <https://www.sbs.com.au/news/fake-coronavirus-alert-warns-queenslanders-to-avoid-areas-with-high-chinese-populations/e7007e5a-f632-479b-8f1f-c85696a0542a>.
- Uribe, A. 2020. China Warns Citizens Not to Travel to Australia. *The Wall Street Journal*, 6 June 2020. <https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-warns-citizens-not-to-travel-to-australia-11591446223>.
- Urry, J., 2007. *Mobilities*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Venugopal, A. 2021. Why Some COVID Variants Are More Racialized Than Others. *Gothamist*, 14 August 2021. <https://gothamist.com/news/why-some-covid-variants-are-more-racialized-others>.
- Versaemel, A., and Pamintuan, J. 2020. International branch campuses: What can we learn from the COVID-19 pandemic? *Routed Magazine*, 24 October 2020. <https://www.routedmagazine.com/intl-branch-campuses-covid>.
- Walden, M. 2020. More than eight in 10 Asian Australians report discrimination during coronavirus pandemic. *ABC News*, 2 November 2020. <https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-11-02/asian-australians-suffer-covid-19-discrimination-anu-survey/12834324>.
- Walker, D., 1999. *Anxious Nation: Australia and the Rise of Asia 1850–1939*. Brisbane: University of Queensland Press.
- Wilson, C. 2020. Racist hoaxes about Chinese people stockpiling in the coronavirus pandemic keep going viral. *Buzzfeed News*, 27 March 2020. <https://www.buzzfeed.com/cameronwilson/coronavirus-racist-hoaxes-chinese-hoarding-viral>.
- Xing, D., and Handley, E. 2021. China's Sinovac, India's Covishield recognised in Australia, giving hope to international students. *ABC News*, 3 October 2021. <https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-10-03/sinovac-covishield-recognition-hopes-for-international-students/100508968>.
- Yang, S. 2020. Video shows Chinese woman being racially attacked in Melbourne over coronavirus. *ABC News*, 6 May 2020. <https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-05-06/coronavirus-woman-racist-attack-in-melbourne/12216854?nw=0&r=HtmlFragment>.
- Yuan, O., and Ding, M. 2021. Australia will soon open to the world, but many Chinese students aren't in a rush to return. *SBS News*, 8 November 2021. <https://www.sbs.com.au/chinese/english/australia-will-soon-open-to-the-world-but-many-chinese-students-aren-t-in-a-rush-to-return>.
- Zhang, M.Y. 2020. Students in China heed their government's warnings against studying in Australia. *The Conversation*, 6 July 2020. <https://theconversation.com/students-in-china-heed-their-governments-warnings-against-studying-in-australia-141871>.