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# Racist and Anti-diversity Attitudes as Predictors of Support for Political Violence among Supporters of Mainstream Political Parties

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## ABSTRACT

Although there are widespread concerns about support for political violence among people affiliated with mainstream political parties, this topic remains largely under-researched. This article examines the relationship between the respondents' support for political violence and their endorsement of social and political positions that are highly divisive between the left and the right. We collected survey data from a sample of 4,019 respondents from Victoria (Australia). Our analyses distinguished between people affiliated with left-wing parties, right-wing parties, and people with no party affiliation, and found that support for racist and anti-diversity positions is significantly associated with support for political violence across the three groups. Specifically, having negative attitudes to ethnic and religious minorities and having negative attitudes to diversity are significant predictors of support for political violence in the right-wing group. Having negative attitudes to diversity is a predictor of support for political violence in the left-wing group. Having anti-Muslim prejudice is a predictor of support for political violence among people with no party affiliation. Other significant predictors are having anti-democratic views (across the three groups) being male and being young (in the left-wing and right-wing groups) and having experienced discrimination (in the the left-wing group).

## KEYWORDS

support for political violence; survey research; political parties; right-wing; left-wing

## Introduction

Left and right wing supporters who engage in violence differ in a number of ways. In the United States, for example, far-right violent extremists are on average older, more likely to be males, less educated, and more economically disadvantaged, than far-left violent extremists.<sup>1</sup> However, no research to date has looked at the differences between left-wing and right-wing party supporters in terms of the predictors of support for political violence. Placing oneself on the right or on the left side of the political spectrum is one of the strongest predictors of a wide range of attitudes and behaviours:<sup>2</sup> it is therefore surprising that left and right partisan identities have not been explored in research looking at the determinants of support for political violence. In this article, we seek to answer precisely that issue, and to contribute to the literature examining the predictors of support for political violence in the general population,<sup>3</sup> and in particular to the more recent studies that have looked at whether strength of political conviction can predict support for political violence.<sup>4</sup>

Our focus here is on political affiliation rather than political ideology, and we do not look at whether supporters of political violence consider themselves to be—for example—right wing or to be conservatives or libertarians. Instead, we examine whether they support a left wing or right wing political party. Specifically, we look at whether the strength of the support for positions (e.g. gay

marriage, women's rights, migrants' rights), which are an expression of partisan political convictions that are divisive between ideological groups, is associated with support for political violence among mainstream groups identifying with left-wing, right-wing and no political parties.

Australia provides an ideal case study for this research because the key themes and debates in Australian mainstream and fringe politics mirror those in other Western, Educated, Industrialised, Rich, Democratic (WEIRD) countries. For example, on the right end of the political spectrum, key issues are the opposition to migration and the conflation between Islam and terrorism (Bluc et al., 2019<sup>5</sup>). On the left of the political spectrum, key issues are migrants' rights, women's equality and LGBTIQ+ rights.<sup>6</sup> In this respect, the key symbols, trends and narratives of the Australian political debate are similar to those in European and North American contexts, and we expect this study's findings to be relevant to these contexts. In the Australian context, as in most WEIRD countries, the threat of terrorism mainly originates from groups like ISIS and Al Qaeda, and from the far-right.<sup>7</sup> In recent years, the Australian far-right has been linked with episodes of extreme violence such as the Christchurch (New Zealand) attack (perpetrated by an Australia-born extremist who had contacts with Australian far-right groups) and a plot to attack left-wing targets in 2016.<sup>8</sup> Nevertheless, Australia has not experienced in recent history a large scale domestic terrorist attack or politically motivated riots such as the Capitol Hill attacks in the US. Therefore, attitudes to political violence in the Australian context are less likely to be contaminated by people's direct experiences of violence as in other WEIRD countries in North America or Europe, and are more likely to be genuine expressions of behavioural intentions based on political conviction.

## The factors associated with support for political violence

The study by Moskalkenko and McCauley<sup>9</sup> is perhaps the most important effort to understand support for political violence in a nationally representative sample of American adults. In the article, the authors introduce the Activism and Radicalism Intention Scales (ARIS), validated across three samples, to distinguish between attitudes and behavioural intentions for activism and radicalism. The main contribution of Moskalkenko and McCauley's<sup>10</sup> work is the distinction between activism (i.e. intentions for legal and non-violent political action) and radicalism (i.e. readiness to engage in illegal and violent political action). The authors find little support for the "conveyor belt" metaphor that implies that activism leads to radicalism. Another important distinction is between behavioural and cognitive radicalisation.<sup>11</sup> Some terrorism studies scholars<sup>12</sup> propose that strength of support for an ideological cause is neither necessary nor sufficient to lead to violence, and that there is a clear divergence between attitudes and behaviours. Other terrorism studies scholars, although they agree that attitudes and beliefs are poor predictors of violent behaviour, argue that these remain an important aspect in understanding the justification for violence and the broader milieu of support from which violent groups and individuals may emerge.<sup>13</sup>

Examining the correlates of support for political violence is the focus of an increasing number of survey-based studies across the globe that use samples of the general population. In contexts marked by civil war and internal armed conflicts, support for political violence increases with rising inequality and entrenched perceived grievance, and decreases in situations of political efficacy.<sup>14</sup> Previous research in the context of WEIRD countries has mostly focused on identifying the associations between support for political violence and variables such as psychological factors, personality, decision-making processes,<sup>15</sup> sensation seeking,<sup>16</sup> low self-control and exposure to violent extremist peers and norms,<sup>17</sup> perceived injustice, anomie, search for meaning,<sup>18</sup> risk perceptions.<sup>19</sup>

McCauley<sup>20</sup> looked at the demographic predictors of support for political violence among the general Muslim population in the US using a measure of justification of "suicide bombing and other forms of violence against civilian targets in order to defend Islam from its enemies," and found that younger and less-educated Muslim respondents were more likely to agree with the item. Canetti et al.<sup>21</sup> looked at predictors of support for political violence in samples of the Israeli population (including both Jewish and Muslim respondents), and measured support for political violence with three items

(sending letters to threaten public figures, using arms to prevent the government from carrying out policies, and physically harming politicians). People with lower education, lower income level and higher perceived discrimination were most likely to support political violence.<sup>22</sup> Hayes and McAllister<sup>23</sup> looked at the factors predicting sympathy for paramilitary violence in Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland, and found that being male, young, Catholic, and not attending Church predicted support for Republican paramilitary violence.

Heaney<sup>24</sup> looked at predictors of justification for political violence in a large sample of Americans who participated in political demonstrations in Washington DC, and found that lower satisfaction with democracy, strength of left-wing ideology, organisational membership, activist identity, being male, being non-white and being young were significant predictors. Importantly, the article highlights differences between the position of left-wing and right-wing respondents on political violence, although it does not look at how predictors might change across different groups. The importance of attitudes towards democracy is confirmed by Bartusevičius et al.,<sup>25</sup> who looked at predictors of engagement in political violence and support for political violence across WEIRD and non-WEIRD countries. In the study, support for political violence was predicted by autocratic orientation (that is, preferences for autocratic forms of governance), being male, young, and having experienced discrimination.

### **The need to disaggregate the samples by political groups**

In this article, we propose to disaggregate our sample by political groups to identify the specific demographic and attitudinal variables that predict support for political violence within each group. Although values and attitudes are highly heterogeneous within both the left and the right,<sup>26</sup> it is possible to pinpoint some key issues that divide most supporters of left-wing and right-wing political parties. For example, people on the right of the ideological spectrum are more likely to mobilize in support of security and nationalist agendas, whilst people on the left tend to mobilize in support of environmental policies, social equality and economic redistribution.<sup>27</sup> Opposition to immigration, in particular Muslim immigration, which tends to be seen as a symbolic threat to Western democratic values, is on average higher on the right.<sup>28</sup> Support for migrants and refugees rights, gender equality and gay rights is on average higher on the left.<sup>29</sup> People on the right are more likely to support military spending, capital punishment and religious education,<sup>30</sup> whereas people on the left are more likely to support gay marriage, abortion rights and gun control.<sup>31</sup>

We propose to test whether attitudes to key socio-political issues, which are an expression of political ideologies and are divisive between political groups, might be associated with support for political violence. Bélanger et al.,<sup>32</sup> looked at predictors of support for political violence in convenience samples of Spanish students, measured by three items: “I would never consider physical violence to further a just cause”; “We should never use violence as a way to change things”; “Violence is necessary for social change.” They found that having an obsessive passion for a cause (regardless of what the cause was, whether climate change, women’s right or the Spanish nation) was associated with affiliating with a radical social network, which in turn was associated with support for political violence. This might suggest that the supporting social and political positions associated with an ideology (e.g., support for gay rights or gender equality among left-wing participants) might be associated with support for political violence in a mainstream sample.

Moreover, we propose to explore whether the relationship between the strength of partisan political convictions and support for political violence might exist among people who do not support any mainstream political party.<sup>33</sup> Non-voters and people who are not affiliated with left or right political parties sometimes play an important role in political movements: in some cases, politics beyond the left–right categorisation merge into mainstream parliamentary democracy, as in the case of the Italian Five Star Movement.<sup>34</sup> In other cases, people with no political preference and non-voters have become an important part of political movements that engaged in violent protest, such as the French Yellow Vests. Survey data of people who support the Yellow Vests found that, although most of its supporters

**Table 1.** Predictors of support for political violence that are used as covariates in the analyses.

Predictors	Source
Being young	Hayes and McAllister (2005); McCauley (2011); Heaney (2020)
Being male	Hayes and McAllister (2005); Heaney (2020)
Being from a diverse background (that is, not being Australian born and/or having not Australian born parents)	Heaney (2020)
Having lower education	McCauley (2011); Canetti et al (2010)
Having lower income	Canetti et al (2010)
Having experienced discrimination	Canetti et al (2010)
Showing more negative attitudes to democracy	Heaney (2020); Bartusevičius et al. (2020)

identify with far-right parties, it is made up of over 20 percent of non-voters and people who do not identify with any political party.<sup>35</sup> This article will consider people who do not identify with either a left or right party as a separate group.

## The current study

This study contributes to the existing literature by examining the differences in predictors of support for political violence among people with different political preferences. We expected that expressing stronger support for social and political positions that are highly divisive between the supporters of right-wing and left-wing parties would be associated with support for political violence as a method of political participation. Theoretically, this expectation is grounded in the radicalisation literature suggesting that commitment to core principles and political ideas is one of the key determinants of support for—and engagement in—political violence.<sup>36</sup> This idea has been the focus of heated debates in terrorism studies, with some scholars notoriously rejecting it<sup>37</sup> and others supporting it.<sup>38</sup> Recent empirical findings provided some support for this hypothesis, finding that having a stronger partisan ideology<sup>39</sup> and having an obsessive passion for a partisan cause<sup>40</sup> was associated with higher levels of support for political violence.

We formulated two hypotheses about how the strength of political conviction would be associated with support for political violence in our study: we expected that support for political violence would be predicted by holding stronger left-wing positions (i.e., gender equality, LGBTIQ+ equality, anti-racism) among participants with left-wing preferences (H1); and by holding stronger right-wing positions (i.e. anti-diversity, anti-Islam, negative attitudes to racial and religious minorities) among participants with right-wing preferences (H2). Additionally, we wanted to explore a new research question that, to our knowledge, has never been addressed before, that is: does the strength of support for partisan political convictions predict support for political violence among people who do not identify with any political party? (RQ1)

We included in our model a list of covariates that previous research found to be associated with support for political violence regardless of political affiliation or ideology, specifically: being younger; being male; being from a culturally and linguistically diverse background (that is, not being Australian born and/or having not Australian-born parents); having lower education; having lower income; having experienced discrimination; having more-negative attitudes to democracy. Table 1 summarises the sources that justify the inclusion of each of the variables tested in our study.

## Data and methods

### Participants and procedure

This study uses data from an online survey of Victorians aged 18 years and over. Participants were recruited through an online survey provider, Dynata, which has a pool of approximately 30,000 Australian panellists who are recruited via invitation. Once registered with Dynata, panellists are

sent invitations to complete online surveys via a link emailed to their personal inbox (registered with Dynata). Panellists are free to complete the survey or reject the invitation (by simply ignoring the request). The panellists were provided with detailed information about the research and were asked if they wished to participate and if they consented to their responses being used for research purposes. Dynata incentivises survey completion by providing e-currency that panellists can redeem for vouchers or loyalty points. The panellists remain anonymous and the de-identified survey data is retained by the researchers. Dynata does not have access to the survey data and are responsible for recruitment only. Ethics approval was granted by the Western Sydney University Human Research Committee (H13485). We used quota sampling targets to ensure the survey matched the Victorian population in terms of age, gender and geographic location. We used three screening questions to meet necessary criteria: participants had to be over 18, participants had to live in Victoria, and participants had to give consent for their survey data to be used for the purposes of research. On average, the survey took approximately 15 minutes to complete.

The survey was conducted in November 2019 and generated a completed sample of 4,019 respondents. The sample was largely representative of the Victorian population (across age, gender and location). Of the total sample, approximately 53 percent were female, 47 percent were male and 0.4 percent identified as non-binary. The sample was evenly distributed across age groups. Participants were however, skewed towards the more highly educated, typical of most online surveys, with 48.2 percent having a tertiary qualification and 44.5 percent having a TAFE or HSC qualification. Our assessment, based on the international literature on political violence, is that this will be unlikely to have generated an elevated representation of those with stronger political convictions or those more disposed towards political violence. The largest group of participants were in some form of employment (40 percent), followed by retirees (20.8 percent), home duties (8.6 percent) and unemployed (6.3 percent). Over half the respondents (55.3 percent) earned less than the average wage, although 32.5 percent earned above the average wage. The majority of respondents were born in Australia (71.9 percent), followed by the United Kingdom (5.0 percent), India (2.7 percent), Malaysia (1.6 percent), New Zealand (1.3 percent), and the Philippines (1.0 percent). There were another 76 countries of birth registered in the sample, this sub-sample accounted for less than 1 percent of the total sample. Aboriginal and/or Torres Strait Islander respondents accounted for 1.4 percent of the sample. The most common family cultural backgrounds were Australian and New Zealander (53.8 percent), Eastern European (4.7 percent), South East Asian (4 percent), Chinese (3.6 percent) and Indian (2.9 percent). English was the main language spoken at home by 90.5 percent of respondents. The most common languages other than English were Cantonese (1.2 percent), Mandarin (0.9 percent), Hindi (0.7 percent), Tagalog/Filipino (0.6 percent) and Vietnamese (0.6 percent). The most common religious affiliations were no religion, agnostic or atheist (44.0 percent), Christian (40.4 percent), other (4.8 percent), Buddhist (3.0 percent), prefer not to say (2.4 percent), Hindu (2.3 percent), Muslim (2.2 percent) and Jewish (1.0 percent). Respondents were spread across the state of Victoria, with 66.2 percent coming from a metropolitan area and 25.4 percent from a regional or rural area. Respondents also came from 65 local government areas (out of a total of 79), the most common being Brimbank (6.4 percent), Melbourne (5.9 percent), Casey (5.3 percent), Greater Geelong (5.0 percent) and Banyule (4.3 percent).

### **Measures**

To divide our sample into three groups (left-wing, right-wing and no affiliation) we recoded the responses to the question “Which political party are you most likely to vote for?” Response choices were: 1- Labor Party (ALP), 2- Liberal Party, 3- National (Country) Party, 4- Greens, 5- No affiliation, 6- Other (please specify). Respondents who selected “5- No affiliation” were recoded as “no affiliation” (N = 996). The Australian Labor Party is the major centre-left political party in the country, and one of the two major parties in Australian politics, along with the centre-right Liberal Party. The Liberal party leads a centre-right coalition with the smaller National (Country) Party, which traditionally represents

graziers, farmers and rural voters. The Australian Greens are a confederation of Green state political parties. All other choices (including the free text answers to “6- Other”) were re-coded by each author independently as being either “left,” “right” or “no affiliation.” Overall, 1,516 respondents were classified as supporting “left-wing” parties, 1,389 as supporting “right-wing” parties, and 996 as having “no affiliation.” Only choices where there was 100 percent of agreement among all authors were maintained. Respondents with missing or ambiguous choices, and responses that were not identified as being unambiguously left or right (N = 118) were removed.

### ***Support for political violence***

Our main dependent variable was support for political violence, which we measured using one item from Moskaleiko and McCauley’s<sup>41</sup> Radicalism Intention Scale (“I would continue to support an organisation that fights for my political and legal rights even if the organisation sometimes resorts to violence”). Based on the discussion in the literature, we selected 18 measures as independent variables and covariates.

### ***Strength of left- and right-wing positions***

To capture support for left-wing positions, we asked participants to rate their support for the following statements: “I support the setting of targets for women in senior positions of employment” (gender equality, adapted from Caravacho et al., 2013), “Marriages between two women or two men should be permitted” (LGBTIQ+ equality, adapted from Wright et al.<sup>42</sup>), “Something should be done to minimise or fight racism in Australia” (anti-racism, adapted from Blair et al.<sup>43</sup>). To capture support for right-wing positions, we asked participants to rate their support for the following statements: “Australia should help refugees fleeing persecution in their homeland” (anti-refugees, adapted from Kamp et al.<sup>44</sup>), “Muslims pose a threat to Australian society,” “I am worried that our rights and freedom are threatened by Muslims in Australia” (anti-Muslim, adapted from Uenal<sup>45</sup>), “Australia is weakened by people of different ethnic backgrounds sticking to their old ways,” “It is NOT a good idea for people of different racial backgrounds to marry one another,” and “I am prejudiced against other races” (anti-diversity, adapted from Blair et al.<sup>46</sup>). Responses to the three items focusing on anti-diversity attitudes were combined for the analyses as explained in detail in the next section. Moreover, we asked “In your opinion, how concerned would you feel if one of your closest relatives were to marry a person of Muslim faith, Jewish faith, Pakistani or Sri Lankan background, other Asian backgrounds, Aboriginal background, African background” (attitudes to minorities).

### ***Covariates***

We then asked age, gender, country of birth and parents’ country of birth, education levels, income, and experiences of discrimination in the last 12 months. Finally, we asked about attitudes to democracy with items adapted from Ananda and Bol<sup>47</sup> and Hatab<sup>48</sup> (“In some circumstances a non-democratic government can be preferred,” “It doesn’t matter what kind of government we have” and “Democratic systems are not effective at maintaining order and stability”) and about trust in police, political parties, climate change science, and other people (general trust). Responses to all items were on a five-point scale, 1 = strongly agree, 2 = strongly disagree, 3 = neither agree nor disagree, 4 = disagree, 5 = strongly disagree. Then, categories were collapsed and we recoded agree and strongly agree as 1, and the other responses as 0, because we were interested in differences between people who support vs oppose each item.

### ***Data analysis strategy***

Statistical analyses were carried out in different steps. Exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) are first conducted to verify the psychometric properties of the following constructs: attitudes to democracy, attitudes to ethnic and religious minorities, and attitude to diversity. Then, measurement invariance through multi-group analysis is investigated for these constructs.<sup>49</sup> The purpose of

measurement invariance is to ensure an equal definition of the latent constructs across the three groups (i.e., individuals with right-wing, left-wing and no political preference).<sup>50</sup> A stepwise procedure that relies on the comparison of progressively more-restricted measurement models is followed.<sup>51</sup> Tests of strong factorial invariance (equality of factor loadings and thresholds across groups), as well as tests of factor mean invariance (equality of factor means across groups), are conducted. All factor analyses and multi-group analyses are carried out using the latent response variable formulation.<sup>52</sup> The theta parametrization available in Mplus V8.3<sup>53</sup> is used in these analyses.

Next, factor scores are saved from invariant measurement models<sup>54</sup> and used as input for subsequent analyses. The outcome variable, as well as observed covariates, are introduced into the model and a binary logistic regression is conducted to evaluate relationships among the variables. Two logistic regression analyses are performed, one using the factor scores derived from the factor analysis and one using the mean of individual item scores. Similar outcomes are found with the two modelling strategies. The results reported in this paper are based on the mean of individual item scores.

Goodness of fit is evaluated using the comparative fit index (CFI),<sup>55</sup> the Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI),<sup>56</sup> the Root Mean Square of Approximation (RMSEA)<sup>57</sup> and its 90 percent confidence interval (90 percent CI). Using Hu and Bentler's<sup>58</sup> guidelines for evaluating overall model fit, a TLI and CFI >0.95, and an RMSEA <0.05 indicate an adequate model fit to the observed data. Next, measurement equivalence is evaluated using practical fit indices (i.e., TLI and RMSEA). Evidence of measurement invariance is supported when the difference in the TLI and the RMSEA between nested models is smaller than 0.05 (Cheung & Rensvold, 2002).<sup>59</sup> For logistic regression, odds ratios (OR) are used to measure the strength of association between the dependent variable and the predictors. Thresholds for interpreting the magnitude of effect sizes (ES) are as follows:<sup>60</sup> ORs of 2.00 (or 0.50), 3.00 (or 0.33) and 4.00 (or 0.25) each represent 'small,' 'moderate' and 'strong' effects, respectively.

Finally, full information maximum likelihood estimation (FIML), is used to account for the missing data. FIML utilizes all available information during the estimation process and provides consistent and efficient population parameters.<sup>61</sup>

## Results

### *Bivariate analysis*

Tables 2 and 3 revealed important differences between the left, right and no-affiliation groups. Males, older people (35 and over), people born in Australia and with both Australian-born parents, and wealthier people are more prevalent on the right. Females, younger and less-wealthy participants were more prevalent among left and no-affiliation groups. Respondents with lower education, overseas-born participants and participants with at least one parent born overseas were more prevalent in the no-affiliation group. Interestingly, people with no affiliation were closer to the left than the right on attitudes to social issues including attitudes to refugees, gender equality, gay marriage, attitudes to ethnic and religious minorities, attitudes to diversity and anti-racism. The only exception is the perceived threat from Muslims, which was higher in the no-affiliation group than the left. Importantly, Tables 2 and 3 showed an ideological heterogeneity within left and right groups. Although most people with negative attitudes to refugees, gender equality, gay marriage, ethnic and religious minorities, diversity and anti-racism were found on the right, a significant minority was also present on the left. In terms of trust, the no-affiliation group tended to be the one with less trust in police, political parties and other people. Trust in climate change science was lower among people on the right than other groups. The average attitudes to democracy were almost identical across the three ideological groups. As for the dependent variable, respondents who agreed or strongly agreed with supporting political violence were more in the left (15.6 percent) and right (16 percent) groups than in the no affiliation group (9.4 percent).



**Table 2.** Frequencies table of the predictors, covariates and the dependent variable.

<b>Variables</b>	<b>Total sample (n = 3901)</b>	<b>Left (n = 1516)</b>	<b>Right (n = 1389)</b>	<b>No affiliation (n = 996)</b>
<b>Gender, n (%)</b>				
Female	1970 (52.80)	794 (55)	605 (45.60)	571 (59.40)
Male	1763 (47.20)	650 (45)	723 (54.40)	390 (40.60)
<b>Country of birth n (%)</b>				
Overseas	933 (25.00)	325 (22.30)	324 (24.80)	284 (29.30)
Australia	2800 (75.00)	1134 (77.70)	982 (75.20)	684 (70.70)
<b>Country of parents' birth n (%)</b>				
At least one parent born overseas	1760 (45.60)	691 (45.90)	579 (42.40)	490 (49.80)
Both parents born in Australia	2096 (54.40)	815 (54.10)	787 (57.60)	494 (50.20)
<b>Age groups n (%)</b>				
35 years and older	2721 (69.80)	985 (65.00)	1083 (78.00)	653 (65.60)
18–34 years old	1180 (30.20)	531 (35.00)	306 (22.00)	343 (34.40)
<b>Education n (%)</b>				
Others	2814 (72.20)	1112 (73.50)	1011 (72.90)	691 (69.40)
No formal education or high school certificate	1081 (27.80)	401 (26.50)	376 (27.10)	304 (30.60)
<b>Income n (%)</b>				
Others	2334 (68.10)	921 (66.60)	889 (72.50)	524 (64.20)
Under 299000	1091 (31.90)	461 (33.40)	338 (27.50)	292 (35.80)
<b>Positive attitude to helping refugees n (%)</b>				
Others	3304 (84.90)	1365 (90.20)	1084 (78.20)	1389 (86.30)
Disagree or strongly disagree	587 (15.10)	149 (9.80)	302 (21.80)	136 (13.70)
<b>Positive attitude to gender equality n (%)</b>				
Others	3297 (84.80)	1389 (91.60)	1057 (76.20)	851 (86.00)
Disagree or strongly disagree	593 (15.20)	123 (8.10)	331 (23.80)	139 (14.00)
<b>Positive attitude to marriage equality n (%)</b>				
Others	3127 (80.40)	1325 (87.60)	965 (69.60)	837 (84.50)
Disagree or strongly disagree	763 (19.60)	188 (12.40)	422 (30.40)	153 (15.50)
<b>Positive attitude to anti-racism n (%)</b>				
Others	3630 (93.40)	1456 (96.30)	1219 (88.10)	955 (96.40)
Disagree or strongly disagree	257 (6.60)	56 (3.70)	165 (11.90)	36 (3.60)
<b>Trust in climate change science n (%)</b>				
Others	3018 (77.50)	1432 (88.70)	908 (65.50)	768 (77.20)
Disagree or strongly disagree	876 (22.50)	171 (11.30)	478 (34.50)	227 (22.80)
<b>Trust in political parties n (%)</b>				
Others	1916 (49.20)	663 (43.80)	875 (63.20)	378 (38.00)
Disagree or strongly disagree	1977 (50.80)	850 (56.20)	509 (36.80)	618 (62.00)
<b>Trust in the police n (%)</b>				

*(Continued)*

Table 2. (Continued).

Variables	Total sample (n = 3901)	Left (n = 1516)	Right (n = 1389)	No affiliation (n = 996)
Others	3296 (84.50)	1276 (84.60)	1211 (87.50)	809 (81.50)
Disagree or strongly disagree	590 (15.20)	233 (15.40)	173 (12.50)	184 (18.50)
<b>General trust n (%)</b>				
Others	3112 (80.10)	1224 (81.00)	1135 (82.10)	753 (76.10)
Disagree or strongly disagree	772 (19.90)	287 (19.00)	248 (17.90)	237 (23.90)
<b>Have you experienced discrimination in the last 12 months n (%)</b>				
No	2867 (73.60)	1101 (72.70)	1066 (76.90)	700 (70.30)
Yes	1030 (26.40)	414 (27.30)	320 (23.10)	296 (29.70)
<b>I would continue to support an organisation that fights for my political and legal rights even if the organisation sometimes resorts to violence n (%)</b>				
Other	3339 (85.50)	1276 (84.40)	1164 (84.00)	899 (90.60)
Agree or strongly agree	551 (14.20)	236 (15.60)	222 (16.00)	93 (9.40)

Table 3. Descriptive statistics for continuous predictors.

	Total sample (n = 3899)		Left (n = 1515)		Right (n = 1389)		No affiliation (n = 996)	
	M	SD	M	SD	M	SD	M	SD
Positive attitudes to democracy	3.41	0.83	3.44	0.83	3.44	0.87	3.33	0.75
Negative attitudes to ethnic and religious minorities (Indian, Pakistani, Sri Lankan, Asian, Aboriginal, African, Muslim, Jewish)	1.70	0.860	1.59	0.83	1.92	0.93	1.55	0.72
Positive attitudes to diversity	3.59	0.87	3.75	0.88	3.36	0.87	3.67	0.77
Positive attitudes to Muslims	3.27	1.12	3.60	1.10	2.87	1.08	3.31	1.05

M = mean, SD = standard deviation

### CFA and measurement invariance

After conducting an exploratory factor analysis, a CFA was carried out separately for three constructs: attitudes to democracy, attitudes to ethnic and religious minorities, and attitude to diversity. With only two indicators, the latent variable attitude to Muslims was not identified. Then, a CFA model with the four latent variables was fitted to the data. For each CFA model, the variance of the factor was fixed to 1 for identification purposes. Furthermore, for each latent construct, measurement errors among indicators were allowed to correlate. All CFA models converged during the estimation process and model fits were adequate with all CFI and TLI greater than 0.95 and all RMSEA smaller than 0.07. In particular, fit indices of the CFA model with all latent variables were good ( $\chi^2(144) = 1765.11$ ,  $p < .000$ , CFI = 0.98, TLI = 0.98, RMSEA = 0.06, 90 percent CI = [0.05, 0.06]). Moreover, an examination of factor loading estimates showed that the indicators were highly related to their purported factors, with  $R^2$  ranging from 0.41 to 0.93. Finally, the results of the measurement invariance provided strong evidence for measurement invariance across groups (the absolute value of the difference of the TLI and RMSEA between nested models were all smaller than 0.05, see Table 4). Standardized path coefficients for the indicators of the latent constructs, as well as composite reliability<sup>62</sup> ( $\omega = 0.68$  to 0.89), are presented in Table 5.

**Table 4.** Results of measurement invariance for party belonging.

	$\chi^2$	df	p-value	CFI	TLI	RMSEA	(90 percent CI)	$ \Delta CFI $	$ \Delta TLI $	$ \Delta RMSEA $
Model 1: Baseline	1348.59	201	<.001	0.98	0.98	0.07	(0.06–0.07)			
Model 2: Factor loadings invariance	1426.90	221	<.001	0.98	0.98	0.07	(0.06–0.07)	0.00	0.00	0.00
Model 3: Thresholds invariance	1765.11	297	<.001	0.98	0.98	0.06	(0.05–0.06)	0.00	0.00	0.01
Model 4: Residuals invariance	2008.16	319	<.001	0.98	0.98	0.06	(0.06–0.07)	0.00	0.00	0.00
Model 5: Factor variance	2153.48	339	<.001	0.98	0.98	0.06	(0.06–0.07)	0.00	0.00	0.00
Model 6: Factor Mean zero in one group	3077.60	339	<.001	0.99	0.99	0.08	(0.07–0.08)	0.01	0.01	0.02
Model 7: Factor Mean zero in all group	6473.13	347	<.001	0.97	0.98	0.12	(0.11–0.12)	0.02	0.01	0.04

$\chi^2$  = Chi-square; df = degree of freedom; SCF = scaling factor; CFI = comparative fit index; TLI = Tucker-Lewis index; RMSEA = root mean square of approximation; 90 percent CI = 90 percent confidence interval;  $\Delta CFI$  = difference in the CFI between nested models;  $\Delta TLI$  = difference in the TLI between nested models;  $\Delta RMSEA$  = difference in the RMSEA between nested models;  $|\cdot|$  = absolute value.

**Table 5.** Standardized factor loadings and composite reliability estimates.

	Coefficients	Composite reliability
<b>Positive attitudes to democracy</b>		0.73
Please indicate how strongly you agree/disagree with the following.—In some circumstances a non-democratic government can be preferred	0.65	
Please indicate how strongly you agree/disagree with the following.—It doesn't matter what kind of government we have	0.65	
Please indicate how strongly you agree/disagree with the following.—Democratic systems are not effective at maintaining order and stability	0.77	
<b>Negative attitudes to ethnic and religious minorities (Indian, Pakistani, Sri Lankan, Asian, Aboriginal, African, Muslim, Jewish)</b>		0.89
In your opinion, how concerned would you feel if one of your closest relatives were to marry a person of . . .—Indian, Pakistani or Sri Lanka background	0.84	
In your opinion, how concerned would you feel if one of your closest relatives were to marry a person of . . .—Other Asian backgrounds	0.77	
In your opinion, how concerned would you feel if one of your closest relatives were to marry a person of . . .—Aboriginal background	0.79	
In your opinion, how concerned would you feel if one of your closest relatives were to marry a person of . . .—African background	0.86	
In your opinion, how concerned would you feel if one of your closest relatives were to marry a person of . . .—Muslim Faith	0.79	
In your opinion, how concerned would you feel if one of your closest relatives were to marry a person of . . .—Jewish Faith	0.69	
<b>Positive attitudes to diversity</b>		0.68
Please indicate how strongly you agree/disagree with the following.—I am prejudiced against other races	0.62	
Please indicate how strongly you agree/disagree with the following.—It is NOT a good idea for people of different racial backgrounds to marry one another	0.73	
Please indicate how strongly you agree/disagree with the following.—Australia is weakened by people of different ethnic backgrounds sticking to their old ways	0.61	
<b>Positive attitudes to Muslims</b>		0.87
Please indicate how strongly you agree/disagree with the following.—Muslims pose a threat to Australian society	0.80	
Please indicate how strongly you agree/disagree with the following.—I am worried that our rights and freedom are threatened by Muslims in Australia	0.70	

All factor loading coefficients are significant at the level of 0.001.

### Binary logistic regression

The results of the binary logistic regression (Table 6) showed that the strength of support for left-wing positions (i.e. gender equality, LGBTIQ+ equality and anti-racism) was not significantly associated with support for political violence in the left-wing group, which means that H1 was not confirmed. However, we found that support for two out of three right-wing positions (negative attitudes to ethnic and religious minorities and negative attitudes to diversity) was significantly associated with support for political violence in the right-wing group, which provides limited support for H2. In the left-wing

Table 6. Binary logistic regressions results.

Variables	Left			Right			No Affiliation		
	Coefficient		Odds Ratio	Coefficient		Odds Ratio	Coefficient		Odds Ratio
	Estimate	SE	Estimate	SE	Estimate	SE	Estimate	SE	
Male	0.63**	0.19	1.87	0.22	1.92	0.30	1.32	0.30	0.74 to 2.36
Overseas born	0.37	0.26	1.45	0.29	0.87	0.39	1.42	0.39	0.66 to 3.04
At least one parent born overseas	-0.28	0.22	0.75	0.02	1.02	0.25	0.55	0.35	0.28 to 1.10
Young (18 to 34)	0.56*	0.19	1.76	1.39***	4.02	0.23	1.25	0.30	0.70 to 2.23
Low education (no formal qualification)	-0.10	0.22	0.91	-0.21	0.82	0.27	0.57	0.35	0.29 to 1.14
Low income (under 29,900)	-0.30	0.21	0.74	-0.49	0.62	0.27	1.03	0.32	0.55 to 1.91
Negative attitudes to refugees	0.28	0.31	1.32	-0.17	0.87	0.28	0.64	0.37	0.31 to 1.33
Positive attitudes to diversity	-0.26*	0.13	0.77	-0.32*	0.73	0.15	0.83	0.25	0.51 to 1.36
Positive attitudes to Muslims	-0.13	0.12	0.88	0.15	1.16	0.13	0.51	0.19	0.35 to 0.74
Negative attitudes to minorities	0.17	0.12	1.19	0.32**	1.46	0.15	1.34	0.17	0.96 to 1.87
Negative attitudes to gender equality	-0.42	0.36	0.66	-0.02	0.98	0.32	1.01	0.41	0.45 to 2.26
Negative attitudes to gay marriage	0.16	0.29	1.18	-0.06	0.94	0.28	1.45	0.37	0.70 to 2.97
Negative attitudes to anti-racism	0.57	0.42	1.77	-0.25	0.78	0.39	0.75	0.65	0.21 to 2.68
Trust in climate change science	-0.55	0.32	0.58	-0.53	0.59	0.30	0.81	0.33	0.43 to 1.53
Trust in police	0.37	0.26	1.44	-0.31	0.41	0.73	1.26	0.38	0.60 to 2.64
Trust in people	-0.41	0.26	0.67	-0.37	0.69	0.32	1.23	0.33	0.64 to 2.36
Positive attitudes to democracy	-0.85***	0.15	0.43	-1.27***	0.28	0.17	0.28	0.28	0.16 to 0.49
Perceived discrimination in the last 12 months	0.63**	0.20	1.88	-0.06	0.94	0.25	1.42	0.33	0.75 to 3.27

CI = confidence intervals; SE = standard error. \*p &lt; .05; \*\*p &lt; .01; \*\*\*p &lt; .001

group, respondents with negative attitudes to diversity were more likely to support violence (OR [95 percentCI] = 0.77, [0.60; 0.99], ES = small). In the right-wing group, respondents with more negative attitudes to ethnic and religious minorities were more likely to support violence (OR [95 percentCI] = 1.46, [1.12; 1.90], ES = small), and respondents with more negative attitudes to diversity were more likely to support violence (OR [95 percentCI] = 0.73, [0.54; 0.97], ES = small). In relation to our exploratory research question (RQ1), we found that having negative attitudes to Muslims was a significant predictor of support for political violence in the no-affiliation group. Respondents with more anti-Muslim attitudes were more likely to support violence (OR [95 percentCI] = 0.51, [0.35; 0.74], ES = small).

Some of our covariates were significantly associated with support for political violence. We found that having negative attitudes to democracy was a significant predictor of support for political violence across the three groups, being male and being young was significantly associated with support for political violence within both left-wing and right-wing groups, and having experienced discrimination was a predictor in the the left-wing group. More specifically, the results show that for respondents on the left, males were nearly two times more likely than females to support violence (OR [95 percentCI] = 1.87, [1.30; 2.69], effect size [ES] = small), and young respondents were nearly two times more likely than older respondents to support violence (OR [95 percentCI] = 1.76, [1.20; 2.56], ES = small). Respondents with negative attitude to democracy were more likely to support violence (OR [95 percentCI] = 0.43, [0.32; 0.57], ES = small. Respondents who had been victims of discrimination were nearly two times more likely than those who did not experience discrimination to support violence (OR [95 percentCI] = 1.88, [1.28; 2.75], effect size [ES] = small). For respondents on the right, males were nearly two times more likely than females to support violence (OR [95 percentCI] = 1.92, [1.25; 2.92], ES = small), but young respondents were four times more likely than older to support violence (OR [95 percentCI] = 4.02, [2.50; 6.26], ES = large). Respondents with negative attitudes to democracy were more likely to support violence (OR [95 percentCI] = 0.28, [0.20; 0.39], ES = moderate). In contrast, in the no-affiliation group, respondents with negative attitude to democracy were more likely to support violence (OR [95 percentCI] = 0.28, [0.16; 0.49], ES = moderate). [Figures 1–3](#) illustrate the main results.

## Discussion

There are widespread concerns about violence affecting political stability including in WEIRD countries.<sup>63</sup> These concerns relate to support for political violence amongst fringe political groups, but also—increasingly—amongst supporters of mainstream political parties.<sup>64</sup> In this study, we explore the unique attitudinal predictors of support for political violence among people with left, right and no political preferences. Using a large sample (N = 4,019) of respondents from Victoria, Australia, we tested whether showing stronger support for left-wing positions would be a predictor of support for political violence among participants with left-wing preferences (H1), and whether showing stronger support for right-wing positions would be a predictor of support for political violence among participants with right-wing preferences (H2). Additionally, we explored whether the strength of support for partisan political convictions is associate with higher levels of support for political violence among people with no party affiliation (RQ1).

We found that none of the variables that we used to measure support for left-wing positions (i.e. gender equality, LGBTIQ+ equality and anti-racism) were significant predictors of support for political violence in the left-wing group. In other words, H1 is disconfirmed. We found that two out of three variables that we used to measure support for right-wing positions were significant predictors of support for political violence among the group with right-wing political preferences. Specifically, we found that negative attitudes to ethnic and religious minorities and negative attitudes to diversity were significant predictors of support for political violence among people with right-wing political preferences, but not anti-Muslim attitudes. We interpret this finding as providing limited support for H2. The fact that anti-Muslim attitudes were not significant predictors of support for political violence in the right-wing group





Figure 1. Odds ratios within the group of left-wing supporters (n = 1,515).

might be explained by the fact that Islamophobia is widespread in Australia—especially among people who support right-wing parties—and not a position that is unique of individuals and groups that support political violence.<sup>65</sup> For this reason, Australian far-right groups have been using an anti-Muslim agenda to recruit new members among supporters of mainstream right-wing parties (Bliuc et al 2019).

In relation to our exploratory research question (RQ1), we found that anti-Muslim prejudice was a key predictor of support for political violence only in the no-affiliation group. Interestingly, the no-affiliation group presented social and political positions that were more similar to the left group than the right. It might be possible that, although the no-affiliation group was mostly composed of people who broadly align with left-wing positions, it included a minority of people who align with right-wing positions, and they were the ones that were more likely to support political violence. It is also possible that people in the no-affiliation group, who on average were less education and are older than the other groups, were more susceptible to perceive a cultural threat from Muslims as a consequence of the media discourses that conflate terrorism with Islam.<sup>66</sup> Our interpretation is in line with research showing that people with no political preference are likely to mobilize with violent protest groups aligned with populist far-right views, such as the French Yellow Vests.<sup>67</sup>



**Figure 2.** Odds ratios within the group of right-wing supporters ( $n = 1,389$ ).

We were not expecting to find a significant association between negative attitudes to diversity and support for political violence in the group of left-wing parties supporters. Our data suggests that there is a small group of respondents on the left that have negative attitudes to diversity, and the majority of them would support political violence. In the Australian context, it is possible that a minority of people who vote for left-wing parties have negative attitudes to diversity: in recent years, voting patterns have revealed that there has been a flow of voters shifting from the centre-left party ALP (Australian Labor Party) to the far-right party One Nation.<sup>68</sup> Journalistic accounts also found that these voters were mainly people from the working class, worried about job security and concerned about immigration.<sup>69</sup> It might be possible that our study identified a small group of people who still vote for a left-wing party but are concerned about diversity and immigration, and could potentially find an ideological alignment with a far-right party like One Nation on issues of immigration.

Anti-diversity and racist attitudes are a key focus of research in social psychology, and underpin the formation of outgroup prejudice: according to Duckitt et al's<sup>70</sup> Dual Process model, authoritarian beliefs (which are strongly associated with support for racial discrimination and hostility to ethnoreligious minorities) and beliefs that other groups are inferior (social dominance orientation) are the




Figure 3. Odds ratios within the group of no party supporters ( $n = 996$ ).

two key ideological determinants of outgroup prejudice. Anti-diversity attitudes—coupled with anti-democratic attitudes, which also emerge as a strong predictor of support for political violence in our study—underpin contemporary populist politics. Previous research found that anti-system attitudes, low trust in democratic institutions, and unsubtle targeting of outgroups (for example, elites associated with globalisation) are characteristics of populist leaders on both the right and the left end of the spectrum.<sup>71</sup> Toxic nationalism and the targeting of migrants and people of diverse religious and ethnic background is a key characteristic of right-wing populist parties,<sup>72</sup> but some combination of nationalism and opposition to migration might appeal to voters on the left side of the political spectrum, too (see for example Germany's radical left movement *Aufstehen*,<sup>73</sup>).

However, outgroup prejudice and support for populist politics are not necessarily associated with aggression and violence. Outgroup prejudice can underpin violence, when it takes the form of blatant bias, but most people who have prejudice to outgroups express it with subtle behaviours of avoidance and discrimination.<sup>74</sup> Future research should investigate whether the strength of anti-democratic and



anti-diversity attitudes can be predictors of support for political violence across different political groups, or whether other factors moderate or mediate the relationship between outgroup prejudice and support for violence against that outgroup.

The unexpected finding that anti-diversity attitudes predict support for political violence among people supporting left-wing parties points to the heterogeneity of attitudes and views within political groups, and especially among those with extreme convictions. This is consistent with previous research: van Hiel<sup>75</sup> and Hanel et al.<sup>76</sup> found that people who place themselves in extreme positions on the left-right spectrum did not resemble each other more than people who position themselves in the middle of the scale. Interestingly, Hanel et al.<sup>77</sup> found that there was a significant heterogeneity of attitudes towards migration among people who self-identify with extreme far-right positions in the EU, which contradicts the homogeneous anti-immigration ideological narratives of European far-right leaders. Future research should investigate the heterogeneity of social and political attitudes among people who support political violence who identify with different political groups (e.g. right-wing, left-wing or no affiliation).

In addition to our main findings in relation to H1, H2 and RQ1, one additional finding concerning our covariates is worthy of some discussion. Our study found that a consistent predictor of support for political violence across the three groups was having negative attitudes to democracy. Specifically, people who agreed or strongly agreed with the items “In some circumstances a non-democratic government can be preferred,” “It doesn’t matter what kind of government we have” and “Democratic systems are not effective at maintaining order and stability” are more likely to support an organisation that resorts to political violence. We suspect that this construct is a consistent predictor across the three groups because it can spring from a variety of ideological positions: it can be expression of an alignment with authoritarian principles of governance,<sup>78</sup> which in WEIRD contexts can be found on the right (fascist regimes), on the left (communist regimes) and in religious groups (theocratic regimes).<sup>79</sup> It can be the expression of poor understanding of democracy, usually associated with poor political knowledge and education.<sup>80</sup> It can be an expression of dissatisfaction with existing representative democratic governance, and support for other forms of democracy such as participatory democracy.<sup>81</sup> It can be the expression of dissatisfaction with politicians and the so-called political establishment, which is reflected in populist anti-elite sentiments, especially in the Australian far right. On the extreme left, some groups might be dissatisfied with democracy because not enough is being done on key issues like climate change, social justice and human rights. Regardless of its causes, public support for democracy is a key factor in maintaining the stability of democratic regimes,<sup>82</sup> and this study confirms its importance in understanding support for political violence in a context like Australia. This article has limitations that need to be addressed in future research. Our sample had quotas matched with the Victorian population census according to age, gender and geographical distribution. However, we acknowledge that the sample is skewed towards the highly educated. As the sample is more educated than the population norms we cannot assume that it is representative of the Victorian population. Accordingly, caution should be exercised in estimating the prevalence of rates of variables in the population on the basis of this sample. However, estimation of the prevalence of phenomena is not the key interest here and instead we focus on estimating the relationships between variables in order to test our hypotheses. For that purpose we do not need a representative sample of Victorians but sufficiently large samples of both left and right aligned voters to conduct adequately powered tests of the hypothesized relationships between the ideological positions and support for violence. Our sample  $N = 4019$  is well suited for that purpose.

One limitation of the primary outcome variable is that it focuses on “political and legal rights.” These are only a subset of possible organisational goals or rationales for individuals supporting political violence. For example, support for violence to combat existential threats (e.g., global warming) may be more widespread than merely considering rights-based rationales, especially on the left of the political spectrum. Also, it is possible that we did not find support for H1 (i.e. the association between strength of support for left-wing positions and support for political violence) because we

focused on the wrong issues: future research should look at whether support for other left-wing positions (e.g. support for climate change policies) is associated with support for political violence in left-wing groups.

Because of the limitation of space available in the questionnaire, many constructs were measured using a single variable (e.g., attitudes to gender equality) or a subset of items (e.g., anti-Muslim attitudes) adapted from existing psychometric scales. A more robust approach for future research would be to use the full scales to capture each of the constructs under investigation. Also, future research should include personality traits and other psychological factors that have been found to be associated with support for political violence, such as decision-making styles,<sup>83</sup> social dominance orientation, right-wing authoritarianism and risk perceptions<sup>84</sup> to understand their interactions with other predictors of political violence that were used in this article. We also acknowledge the limitations of collapsing Likert scales into binary variables (agree and strongly agree = 1, other responses = 0). Further studies should consider a larger range of response categories.

Finally, we acknowledge that some of the items that we used to measure attitudes to outgroups (e.g. “It is NOT a good idea for people of different racial backgrounds to marry one another”) and support for political violence (i.e. “I would continue to support an organisation that fights for my political and legal rights even if the organisation sometimes resorts to violence”) are direct, and the responses might be affected by social desirability bias. Although we mitigated the risk of social desirability bias by having an anonymous survey, we acknowledge that we cannot completely rule out this risk. However, we also recognize that most state-of-the-art research on topics related to support for political violence and prejudice use the same direct and straight-forward items (see for example<sup>85</sup>). This is the same approach used in foundational studies in this area of research.<sup>86</sup> We do not believe that the results (i.e. right-wing but not left-wing stances are associated with support for political violence) could be fully explained by bias (i.e. left-wing people are more subject to social desirability bias than right-wing people) because previous research found positive attitudes to political violence to be higher among individuals with stronger left-wing convictions using the same measures of support for political violence (Heanery 2020). Moreover, in order to mitigate the impact of social desirability bias, our survey was completely anonymous.

A comprehensive theory of the root causes of individual support for political violence is still lacking.<sup>87</sup> Prior research identified a list of predictors of support for political violence, such as being male (Haney 2020<sup>88</sup>), being young,<sup>89</sup> low education, low income, experience of discrimination,<sup>90</sup> and anti-democratic attitudes (Haney, 2020<sup>91</sup>). In the public debate, it is not uncommon to read crosscutting claims of equivalence in terms of the support for violence amongst ostensibly left- and right-wing political movements.<sup>92</sup> This article challenges this idea by showing that, in the Australian context, there are importance nuances and differences in the predictors of political violence across different political groups. Strength of support for some right-wing positions (such as being anti-diversity and prejudice to minorities) is significantly associated with support for political violence among voters of right-wing parties. Interestingly, support for some right-wing positions is significantly associated with support for political violence among people who vote for left-wing parties (i.e. anti-diversity attitudes) and also people with no affiliation (i.e. anti-Muslim attitudes). However, strength of support for left-wing positions is not associated with support for political violence among voters of left-wing parties. Being male and young is a predictor of support for political violence only among left and right groups, but not among people who do not identify with any political party. Experiencing discrimination is a predictor only among people on the left. Anti-democratic attitudes predict political violence across party groups, but these attitudes might be motivated by different political positions in each group. This study is particularly useful to improve our understanding of support for political violence, and it points to the importance of studying the different ways in which anti-democratic and anti-diversity attitudes are associated with support for political violence among different political groups.<sup>93</sup>

## Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

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